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ABSTRACT 
 
 
JASON PHILLIP BERKOWITZ. Three essays in market efficiency:  An examination of 
market reaction to information. (Under the direction of DR. STEVEN CLARK & DR. 
CRAIG A. DEPKEN, II) 
 
 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) examines how quickly and accurately 
information is reflected in a security price, and as a result, it has become one of the 
primary areas of focus in financial literature.  I explore three problems regarding the 
release of information and the impact it has on price.  First, I show that securities‟ prices 
are influenced by the introduction of other securities.  The offering of betting lines does 
influence the accuracy of pricing; however, the unbiasedness seems unaffected.  
Additionally, I find evidence of the linear relationship between the money line and sides 
line, similar to the security market line, ends up breaking down as a result of the 
bookmaker offering a higher payout in the money line to the favorite team in order to 
entice bettors.  Next, I examine if winning or losing influences sports clubs‟ financial 
performance.  While there is literature, with mixed results, that examine the market 
reaction to winning and losing for publicly-traded clubs, the question; does winning 
influence the clubs‟ financial performance has been sidestepped.  Results from English 
soccer clubs suggest that match performance does impact a club‟s operating income, but 
the impact differs for “elite” and “non-elite” clubs.  Lastly, utilizing English soccer club 
data again, I reexamine market reaction to good and bad news by looking at matches 
where both clubs were publicly-traded – seeing the market‟s reaction to the win and the 
loss simultaneously.  While my results contradict previous literature, that the market 
reacts to good news faster, this is because I find that losing is a stronger signal. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is one of the major academic 
contributions to the understanding of basic finance and is one of the primary areas of 
focus in the financial literature.  The EMH‟s initial form argues that all relevant 
information is fully reflected in a security‟s price.  Eugene Fama has been generally 
credited as the father of EMH, which stemmed from his Ph.D. thesis work in the 1960‟s 
at the University of Chicago and highlighted in his now classic Journal of Finance paper 
in 1970 entitled "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work."  
Fama distinguishes between three types of market efficiency: weak, semi-strong, and 
strong. Since the land mark work of Fama there have nevertheless been anomalies that 
bring into question the existence of market efficiency, such as the January effect or the 
existence of market crashes.  As a result, over the ensuing years, and especially during 
the last two decades, many papers have appeared providing supporting evidence for and 
against market efficiency.  This dissertation consists of three essays that examine the 
market‟s reaction to the release of information through different channels.  These three 
essays use unique datasets related to sports to examine and extend the literature on 
market efficiency.  All three papers extend the previous literature by examining market 
efficiency as it relates to the release of information, firm performance, and the release of 
additional securities. 
2 
My second chapter, “More Accurate Asset Pricing: Analysis from the Betting 
Market” examines whether the release of additional securities provides more accurately 
priced securities.  That is, does each additional security provide additional information to 
the market about the firm‟s financial performance and investor expectation of future cash 
flows?  Testing this hypothesis is not straight-forward, as noted by Smith (1986).  To 
avoid many of the measurement problems that are encountered in other contexts, I utilize 
a unique set of NCAA college basketball betting data.  In betting on college basketball 
games there are three types of betting lines: the sides line, the money line, and the totals 
line – not to mention a wide variation across games on which lines are offered.  This 
particular betting market is convenient because, relative to a traditional stock market, 
there is less signaling on the part of management, the true price of a betting line is more 
accurately measured, and additional betting lines are not always offered. The findings in 
this paper indicate that while additional betting lines offer more information, the sides 
line‟s accuracy is only marginally (negatively) affected when the totals line is missing.  
Yet this accuracy does not affect the market‟s unbiasedness.  A missing money line does 
not impact the accuracy of the sides line.  The relationship between the money line and 
the sides line should be linear and comparable to the security market line in the 
traditional stock market.  One of the biggest findings in this paper is that this linear 
relationship breaks down once the favorite is expected to win by more than seven points.  
The key novel approach taken in this paper is the examination of the impact of additional 
betting lines and the assessment as to whether they have any impact on each other. 
My third chapter, “Does Winning Really Matter? An Examination of EPL Club 
Performance and Earnings” re-examines the discussion of whether winning in sports 
3 
affects a club‟s financial performance.  The previous literature focusing on stock price 
reaction to a club‟s on-field performance has provided mixed results.  Until now the issue 
of whether a club‟s financial performance is affected by on-field performance has been 
sidestepped.  Yet this relates directly to Fama‟s (1970) definition of market efficiency: A 
market in which prices always „fully reflect‟ available information is considered 
„efficient‟.  Announcements by firms can be noisy and have low dissemination, as a result 
of the leaking of information to insiders.  Therefore, it is difficult to directly test the 
impact of good or bad news on firm performance.  The findings indicate that winning 
affects (positively) elite and non-elite club financial performance differently, which is 
only minimally observed by the stock market reaction to a loss.   
The fourth chapter, “A Re-examination of Asymmetric Reaction to Good and Bad 
News: A Test from Match Outcome” looks at the asymmetric market reaction to good 
and bad news.  This literature primarily starts with Chan (2003), who finds the market 
generally reacts faster to good news.  Using match-level data describing games in which 
both are publicly-traded, facilitates a test of whether the market responds simultaneously 
to good news and bad news.  By its very nature, the end of a soccer match provides 
widely disseminated and purely public information.  In the case of a draw, the 
information might be considered somewhat neutral for both teams.  Therefore, it might 
not be expected to have much of a market reaction – all else equal.  However, if one team 
wins the other team necessarily losses; for one team the news is ostensibly good news for 
the other ostensibly bad.  Thus, the framework allows for the simultaneous investigation 
of the market reaction to good and bad news.  The results found in this analysis indicate 
4 
that losing is a stronger signal.  The insinuation behind the results is that losing implies 
more losing in the future; whereas winning does not predict future winning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2:  MORE ACCURATE ASSET PRICING: ANALYSIS FROM THE  
BETTING MARKET 
Examining how information affects security prices has been a topic of great 
interest in the financial literature.  There have been a number of event studies looking at 
common stock price reactions to security offerings, firm announcements, and 
macroeconomic announcements.  Smith (1986) provides a summary of stock price 
reactions to additional security offerings.  Smith generalizes that the average abnormal 
returns are non-positive.  Similar to the securities offered by the firm, options on common 
stock impact common stock price.
1
  The reaction of stock prices to the introduction of an 
option was positive until 1980, after which it became negative.  Sorescu (2000), using an 
optimal switching means model, finds the optimal-switching date was sometime between 
December 12, 1980 and June 29, 1981.   
The studies on options seem to have been inconclusive about their impact on 
common stock.  The most common and celebrated model for pricing options is that of 
Black-Scholes (1973).  Their model argues that options are redundant securities that can 
be replicated by a self-financing strategy in the underlying stock and a risk-free security. 
Although the Black-Scholes model has attracted a great deal of attention and achieved 
significant success, other models have been developed to price options, notably Ross 
(1976), Detemple (1990), Detemple and Seldon (1991), and Easley et al. (1998).  These 
                                                          
1
 See Branch and Finnerty (1981), Conrad (1989), Detemple and Jorion (1990), Sorescu (2000) and 
Danielsen and Sorescu (2001). 
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alternative theoretical models imply that options can impact stock prices.  In fact, 
empirical evidence seems to support the argument that options do impact the underlying 
stock‟s price.  This is illustrated by Back (1993), who develops a pricing model that 
incorporates the intuition that options can increase the amount of information available 
concerning the underlying asset.   
This paper does not test the question of whether there is a reaction to the offering 
of additional securities. Rather, the empirical analysis focuses on whether the price of a 
common stock becomes more accurate when additional securities on a firm‟s future cash 
flows exist.  Additional securities might reveal additional information about the firm and 
its future cash flows, resulting in a more accurate common stock price.  Furthermore, if 
additional securities result in more accurate pricing of a common stock, does this yield a 
more efficient market?  There are two major hurdles in attempting to directly answer 
these questions.  First is the difficulty in determining the true or fundamental value of the 
stock.
2
  Second, other securities may have other consequences that arise from the 
information asymmetry between managers and investors.  Smith discusses five possible 
reasons for his non-negative findings, all of which can impact the test that additional 
securities result in more accurate common stock prices.
3
  
To date, a gap in the literature is whether additional securities on a firm result in 
more accurate pricing of these securities.  To assess this problem and to avoid the 
inherent problems with using traditional stock markets,  this paper takes advantage of the 
                                                          
2
 Kumar et al. (1998) conclude option listings result in more efficient pricing on the underlying asset by 
using Hasbrouck (1993) model that looks at pricing errors and uses a test that the market is weakly 
efficient, i.e. stock prices follow a random walk.   
3
 Smith (1986) offers the following explanations for the non-negative stock returns after an additional 
security is offered: (1) optimal capital structure; (2) implied cash flow; (3) unanticipated announcement; 
(4) information asymmetry; and (5) ownership change. 
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unique characteristics of betting market data from the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) Division I (DI) basketball.  The key benefit in using a betting 
market is that the end result of each game is observed, which allows one to actually 
assess the effective true price and accuracy of the betting lines. These outcomes allow 
one to look back and see how accurate the different betting lines were.
4
  This is in 
contrast to a standard stock market, in which it is difficult to determine the true price of 
the stock because it is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately assess the value of the 
firm – whether at a given time or over time.  Additionally, in the standard stock market, 
common stock never matures; one never gets the opportunity to reach an end point and 
accurately look back and see what the price should have been. 
Additionally, it has been shown that bookmakers are not necessarily the most 
informed people in a betting market, similar to the idea that market makers are not 
necessarily the most informed individuals in traditional financial markets.  Unlike in the 
case of a firm issuing additional debt or equity securities, in a betting market there is no 
concern of bankruptcy if an additional betting line is offered on a particular game. The 
offering of additional lines does not result in any of the five possible negative reactions 
that Smith discusses for the common stock non-negative reactions.  
The betting market allows for a more direct examination into whether additional 
securities, in this case additional betting lines, reveal additional information about the 
underlying asset and whether any additional information has implications for asset 
pricing and unbiasedness.  The NCAA DI basketball betting market has three types of 
betting lines.  Section 1.1 provides a general overview of the betting market and 
                                                          
4
 See section I for an overview of the betting market and an explanation of the three types of betting 
lines. 
8 
description of the three types of betting lines.  Having additional betting lines allows 
informed traders more possible positions and strategies which might allow them to take 
advantage of any information they hold.  Additionally, as discussed in Section 1.1, these 
additional lines reveal more information to the market about a game‟s outcome than 
would be available if the lines were not offered.  This is similar to how additional 
securities can provide additional information about how the market views a firm‟s cash 
flows and future performance.   
In the data employed in this paper, the sides line, which reflects the market‟s 
expectation of how the game will conclude (in terms of point differential between the 
favorite and the underdog), exists for all games for which betting is offered.  The same is 
not true for the money line, which reflects the relationship between money won and 
money bet regardless of the points scored on which team wins.  Nor is it true for totals 
line, which reflects the market‟s expectation of the total points scored in the game –
regardless of which team wins.  These two additional betting lines serve the same 
purpose as additional securities:  Offering the money line and/or the totals line allows 
bettors (investors) to take positions they could not have taken given initial information.  
The money line and totals line both result in the release of more information about the 
game‟s predicted outcome, and, therefore, act in a similar way as to the offering of 
additional securities by providing more information on the underlying asset.   
Results obtained using standard techniques, suggest that sides line accuracy 
increases when a totals line is offered, as reflected in a smaller forecast error, but does not 
change with the existence of a money line.  Additional analysis reveals that the expected 
linear relationship between the money line and the sides line breaks down once the 
9 
favorite becomes too heavily favored.  Very large sides lines have a diminishing impact 
on the favorite team‟s subjective probability of winning, consistent with diminishing 
returns to additional information concerning the favorite‟s probability of winning – partly 
because of the natural upper bound to the favorite‟s subjective probability of winning.  
This concave relationship suggests that, for a large number of games in the sample, the 
money line does not offer sufficient additional information to impact the accuracy of the 
sides line. However, there is no evidence that this improved accuracy in the sides line 
reduces or impacts any bias that may exist in the sides line.   
  
10 
2.1 Overview on NCAA Basketball Betting Markets 
Before providing an overview of the betting market for NCAA DI basketball, it is 
useful to consider the schedule structure of an NCAA basketball season.  During 
November and December, the first two months of the NCAA basketball season, teams 
generally schedule non-conference games and participate in tournaments across the 
United States, Virgin Islands, Bahamas, and Puerto Rico, although a few teams do start 
playing conference games during the last few days of December. The tournament games 
are generally considered to be held at neutral sites, that is, at neither team‟s home court.
 5
  
From January through the first week of March, teams engage primarily in conference 
play; the teams play other teams within their conference, although a non-conference 
game may be scheduled.  The first two weeks of March focus on conference tournaments 
which determine conference champions. The winners of these tournaments generally 
receive automatic berths in the NCAA Tournament, commonly referred to as March 
Madness.
6
  The last weeks of March and the first couple of weeks in April are associated 
with the four national post-season tournaments.
7
 
Unlike betting in the National Football League (NFL), where the market is open 
for about a week, the NCAA basketball betting market is only open for a short period of 
                                                          
5
 Some of the more notable tournaments are the Great Alaska Shootout, the Maui Invitational, the 
National Invitational Tournament (NIT) Season Tip-Off, and the Puerto Rico Tip-Off. 
6
 The Ivy Conference is the only conference that does not use a tournament to declare the conference 
champion.  The Ivy Conference Champion is the team with the best record at the end of regular season 
play and receives an automatic berth into the NCAA Tournament. 
7
 The NCAA Tournament, NIT, College Basketball Invitational Tournament (CBI), and CollegeInsider.com 
Postseason Tournament (CIT) are the four tournaments that are held at the end of the season.  The 2007 
season was the inaugural season for the CBI and 2008 was the inaugural season for the CIT.  All games in 
the NCAA tournament are played at neutral sites.  The semifinals and finals of the NIT are played at 
Madison Square Garden while the earlier rounds are played on the home court of the higher seeded 
team, with a few exceptions.  The CBI and CIT are played on the home court of the higher seeded team.   
11 
time, not exceeding 12 hours, similar to the National Basketball Association‟s (NBA) 
betting market.  The NCAA betting market begins with the posting of the opening lines at 
8:00 a.m. Pacific Standard Time (PST) at all the major sports booking sites in Las Vegas 
for all of the games scheduled that day.  The market for each game closes at tip-off, 
resulting in betting lines for some games being open for only a couple hours while for 
other games betting lines may be open for up to 12 hours depending on the exact location 
and time zone of the game.
8
   
Opening lines represent the bookmaker‟s expectation of the game outcome 
(expectation for the line or difference between the scores of the favorite and the underdog 
at the end of the game) and the bookmaker‟s perception of the betting market‟s 
evaluation of these outcomes (Gandar et al. 1998).  The intent of the bookmaker is to pick 
the line such that equal dollar amounts are wagered on each side of the line.
9
  The lines 
can fluctuate while the betting line is open, reflecting differences between the expectation 
of the bookmaker and the expectation of the market.  Therefore, the closing line can be 
viewed as the market‟s expectation of the game‟s outcome.   
In the NCAA betting market there are three types of betting lines; for example, 
Table 1 provides the betting information for the game between Maine and Richmond on 
November 5, 2007. This example will be used to help explain each of the three types of 
betting lines.  The first betting line is the sides line (SL), which allows a bettor to make a 
wager on either team.  The SL also includes what is called “points” to encourage betting 
                                                          
8
 On Saturday and Sunday tip-offs on the east coast start at noon or one in the afternoon, which results in 
the market only being open for an hour, compared to games that are on the west coast or Hawaii that 
could stay open for as long as 12 hours if the game is played in the evening local time.   
9
 Levitt (2004) shows that the books are not always balanced and that the bookmaker generates a profit 
from his ability to more accurately predict game outcomes than the average bettor, by limiting the 
amount that can be wagered by any bettor.  Humphreys et al. (2009) find that changes in sides line bets 
on NCAA basketball games are not induced to balance betting on either side.   
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on the underdog.  These points are commonly referred to as the point spread.  As a result, 
a wager on the favored team only wins if the favored team wins by more than the stated 
point spread.  Looking at Table 1, the SL is listed as 5.5 for Richmond, which means that 
for a wager placed on Richmond to win, Richmond must win the game by six points or 
more, otherwise the wager on Maine wins.  In case the SL is a whole number, and the SL 
turns out to be the actual difference between the score of the favorite and the underdog, 
all wagers are returned with no winners.  This outcome is commonly referred to as a 
“push”.  In the Maine-Richmond example, the line is 5.5, so there is always a winner; a 
push cannot occur. 
 
TABLE 1: Betting Data for Maine and Richmond Game on November 5, 2007 
 
Below are the closing betting lines for the first game in the dataset 
Date Team SL TL ML
11/5/2007 Maine 127.5  200
Richmond 5.5 -240  
 
The second type of betting line is the totals line (TL). The TL allows a bettor to 
make a wager on the combined score of both teams.  In the Maine-Richmond example, 
the TL is 127.5.  In this situation, one can wager that the combined score will exceed 
127.5, commonly referred to as the “over”, or wager that the combined score is less than 
127.5, commonly referred to as the “under”.  As with the SL, if the TL is an exact 
number and the actual combined scores equals the TL, the result is a “push”. The TL also 
differs from the SL in that the wager is not tied to which team actually wins the game. 
13 
The third type of betting line is the money line (ML), which allows a wager to be 
placed on which team will win regardless of the difference in scores.  Here the underdog 
is posted as a positive wager, and the favorite is posted as a negative wager.  The 
negative wager on the favorite indicates the amount of money that must be wagered in 
order to win $100 plus the value of the original wager.  In the case of a positive wager on 
the underdog, the value indicates how much will be won on $100 wager on the underdog.   
In Table 1, the ML on Maine is +200 and for Richmond is -240.  The interpretation of the 
+200 for Maine is that a wager on Maine of a $100 will result in a payoff of $300 (which 
corresponds to the $200 plus the original wager of $100) if Maine wins and a payoff of 
zero if they lose.  The interpretation of the -240 for Richmond is that a wager on 
Richmond (the favorite as indicated by the negative number) of $240 will result in a 
payoff of $340 (which corresponds to $100 plus the original wager of $240) and a payoff 
of zero if they lose. 
It should be noted that by having the ML for both teams, one can calculate the 
subjective probability of each team winning the game.  This is explained in the following 
example using the approach and notation employed by Sauer (2005).  The first step in 
this calculation is to convert the ML into equivalent odds measured as the ratio between 
payoff and amount bet; for Table 1, these odds are 2.0 (2.0/1.0) for Maine and 0.416 
(1.0/2.4) for Richmond (i.e. a $1 bet on Maine pays $3 and a $1 for Richmond pays 
$1.42).  In an efficient market with no transaction costs, these odds can be converted to a 
probability:              .  In the example above the probability of Maine winning 
is 0.333 and probability of Richmond winning is 0.706.  When bookmakers do not offer 
fair odds, the probabilities total to more than 1.0; the approach is to normalize the 
14 
probabilities to obtain the subjective fair probability,      .  This is done by dividing each 
team‟s probability of winning by the sum of both teams‟ probabilities, to give the 
subjective probability of winning.  In this example, the normalized fair probability for 
Maine is 0.321 (0.333/[0.333+0.706]) and for Richmond is 0.679 (0.706/[0.333+0.706]).  
When the ML does not exist, these probabilities cannot be generated from only offering 
the SL and TL. 
While the SL and TL cannot be utilized to calculate the probabilities of each team 
winning, they do offer other information. From the definitions for the SL and TL, each 
can be expressed as: 
                                      (1) 
                                       (2) 
When both SL and TL are offered, one can calculate the expected points scored by each 
team, as shown by Borghesi and Dare (2009) and Dare and Dennis (2011) using 
equations 3 and 4:
10
 
                
     
 
  (3) 
                
     
 
 (4) 
When either line (TL and SL) is not offered, it is not possible to calculate the expected 
points scored by both teams.   
From the discussion above, the betting lines ML and TL clearly provide 
additional information to the market that is not necessarily available to all market 
participants when only the SL is available for a given game.  In this paper, the SL is 
                                                          
10
 While the team scores are expressed as favorite and underdog, one could express them as home and 
away as demonstrated in Dare and Dennis (2011).   
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considered analogous to a common stock since it always exists whether the other betting 
lines are offered.  The betting lines ML and TL are considered additional investment 
vehicles in the betting market. The empirical question is whether the availability of any 
additional betting lines provides information to market participants that is reflected in a 
more accurate SL or a more unbiased market.  
While betting occurs in almost all sports, the NCAA basketball betting market is 
used here because it has a larger amount of variation in the betting lines offered among 
games compared to other popular sports.
11
  This variation in the market facilitates testing 
the impacts of offering additional lines on the accuracy of the SL.
12
  
  
                                                          
11
 For example, during the 2007-2010 NFL regular seasons the betting market offered all three betting 
lines for all games played.  When looking at NCAA DI football, almost all of the games offer all three 
betting lines, while only a handful of games were missing betting lines. 
12
 While the authors assume that bookmakers randomly do not offer lines, it is possible there is a 
selection bias in the data where bookmakers may not offer certain lines as a result of game 
characteristics.  This issue is left for future research. 
16 
2.2 Literature Review 
A. Overview of Literature on Common Stock Price Reaction to Offerings 
While the examination of the impact of additional securities on the accuracy of 
common stock prices has been unexamined, the impact of their offering on common 
stock reaction and returns has been examined in great detail.  Smith (1986) offers a 
summary of previous findings on common stock price reactions to new offerings 
(common stock, preferred stock, convertible preferred stock, straight debt, and 
convertible debt), with preferred stock and straight debt having effects that are not 
significantly different from zero.  It is important to note that for preferred stock and 
straight bond offerings, the common stock price reaction was not significantly different 
from zero, but were significantly negative for common stock, convertible preferred stock 
and convertible bond offerings.  Smith provides the generalization that the average 
abnormal returns of common stock are non-positive, as well as five explanations for these 
findings.   
Until the 1990s, most of these event studies looked only at the short-term affects.  
Looking at long-term (five-year) performance of common stock price after initial public 
offerings and seasoned equity offerings (SEO), Loughran and Ritter(1995) find both 
underperform, which is consistent with the results using short-term performance. In 
particular, their findings for SEO are similar to Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995).  
Furthermore, Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) find long-run stock price 
underperformance following straight or convertible debt offerings, which is different than 
17 
the results discussed in Smith (1986) for straight debt in the short-run.
13
  Nevertheless, 
the results of Spiess and Affleck-Graves are weakly supported by Dichev and Piotroski 
(1997), who find underperformance for firms in the quintile for largest debt offering, but 
not for all debt offerings.   
In more recent years, there has been a greater focus on common stock reaction to 
the offering of options.  Branch and Finnerty (1981) were the first to look at this.  While 
they conclude that the underlying stock price increases after call options are offered, their 
finding stems from what they recognize as a selection bias – in that call options are only 
offered on the better performing stocks.  However, they find the reaction to the 
introduction of puts or dual listings, both puts and calls, is generally random.  In 
examining their results as a whole, they conclude that their findings suggest that initial 
option listings on a stock tend to have a positive impact on the price and trading volume 
of the underlying stock.  Conrad (1989), who looks at the introduction of options from 
1974-1980, finds a permanent price increase around the introduction – not the 
announcement of an option.  Additionally, the variance of the underlying stock‟s return 
declines after the option on a stock is introduced while the systemic risk is unaffected.  
Conrad concludes that “the evidence suggests that options are not completely redundant 
securities.”  Detemple and Jorion (1990), using data from 1973-1986, confirmed 
Conrad‟s findings that the underlying stock price increases when an option is introduced.  
They also find that the volatility of the underlying stock declines after the listing date of 
an option, indicating that the introduction of an option actually stabilizes the underlying 
                                                          
13
 Smith (1986) uses results from Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Eckbo (1986), and Mikkelson and Partch 
(1986) for his discussion on straight debt.  They all find a negative, but insignificant, reaction to the 
offering of straight debt.   
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price of a stock.  What is most interesting about their work is that their results are weaker 
in the latter part of their sample period, which is consistent with Sorescu (2000) findings 
that the introduction of an option results in a price increase in the underlying stocks 
during the time period from 1973 to 1980, but after 1980 the effect of options becomes 
negative. Sorescu uses an optimal switching means model and concludes the optimal 
switching date was determined to have occurred sometime between December 12, 1980 
and June 29, 1981.  While Sorescu acknowledges the argument of Detemple and Jorion 
(1990), that this change may be the result of the introduction of stock index options in 
April 1982, he proposes that a change in regulatory environment of standardized option 
trading during 1980 and 1981 might be the source of these results. 
Chakravarty et al. (2004) are the first to examine and point out that the percentage 
of price discovery on a stock comes from the options market while also providing 
evidence of price discovery in the option market.  They find that the option market‟s 
contribution to price discovery on the underlying asset is about 17%.  These results 
provide support to the argument that additional securities on the same cash flows should 
provide more information leading to more accurate prices.   
The question addressed in this paper is most similar to that addressed by Kumar et 
al. (1998), who look at the impact of option listings on the underlying asset and conclude 
that options benefit underlying stocks by having higher liquidity, lower information 
asymmetry, and greater price efficiency.  Kumar et al. (1998) use Hasbrouck‟s (1993) 
model to look at pricing errors and conclude that the introduction of options decreases the 
pricing errors in the underlying asset, leading to the underlying stock being more 
efficiently priced after the listing of an option.  Hasbrouck‟s model argues that an 
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efficient price evolves as a random walk, which implies a stock price is efficient if it 
follows a random walk consistent with the weak-form of the EMH.  This paper tries to 
examine a much broader scope of the problem concerning whether additional information 
in securities is able to be incorporated into more accurate pricing. 
B. Literature on Betting Markets 
A large part of the economic and financial literature utilizing betting market data 
has done so with the purpose of examining if prices have a bias.  Betting markets provide 
an optimal examination of market unbiasedness because of the short time horizon and the 
well-defined end point of its offerings.  These aspects allow economists to look back and 
see what the true betting lines should be.  This is not possible in the stock market, where 
there is no clear consensus of the true price of any given stock and a stock does not have 
a designated maturity date.   While there is a large body of literature that has investigated 
the unbiasedness of different betting markets, here the focus is on only that associated 
with the area of basketball because the data used in this paper is an NCAA basketball 
dataset.
14
     
Brown and Sauer (1993a) look at the changes in the SL for NBA games to 
examine the observed unexplained asset price volatility and find that the noise component 
of the error is not irrelevant but, in fact, a vital component in predicting the outcome of a 
game.  Gandar et al. (1998) look at the change in the opening and closing SL data for 
NBA games and conclude from their findings that closing SL are more accurate 
predictors of the game outcome than the opening SL.  Their main conclusion is that the 
changes in the prices are the result of informed traders influencing the market, and not 
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 For an overview of the betting market in general, specifically related to horse-racing, see Sauer (1998). 
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just noise.  Hence, it can be argued that as a result of the prices reflecting the new 
information into the SL that this market is at least weakly unbiased.  Gandar et al (2000) 
extend their previous work to investigate unbiasedness of the TL betting line in the NBA 
betting market.  They show that the closing TL is a more accurate forecast of the total 
points scored in a game than the opening TL, similar to their work on the SL.  Gandar et 
al. (2000) conclude that bettors have information that is not initially priced into the 
bookmakers‟ opening SL and TL.  Paul et al. (2004) confirm that the NBA TL is 
unbiased as a whole, but they also find some groupings of TL, that under some 
conditions, seem to win at a statistically higher percentage than 50%.  Nevertheless, these 
occurrences do not result in a profitable strategy using the log-likelihood test.  Paul et al. 
provide a psychological argument indicating that this is likely the result of the tendency 
to have a consumption value of cheering for more points rather than fewer points.  This 
leads to a situation of over-betting the over in the total market.  Paul and Weinbach 
(2005a) investigate the NCAA basketball SL market from the 1996-2003 seasons to 
examine its unbiasness.  They conclude that, in general, the NCAA basketball betting 
market is an unbiased market.   
While, as a whole, basketball betting markets seem to be unbiased, much like 
financial markets, there have been some observed biases.  The most notable bias in 
betting markets is referred to as the “favorite-longshot bias”. The favorite-longshot bias is 
a phenomenon where on average bettors tend to over bet the longshot (i.e. underdog) 
winning and under bet the favorite winning.  In some betting markets, the opposite has 
been observed, which is referred to as the “reverse favorite-longshot bias”.  Paul and 
Weinbach (2005a) look at the NCAA basketball betting market and find that favorites of 
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20 points or more are not fair bets at the 10% level, since underdogs win 52.9% of the 
time.  These results would be consistent with favorite-longshot bias, but are not large 
enough to be profitable.  They also find that road favorites expected to win by ten or 
more points end up winning 54.57 percent of the time.  While these teams win a 
significantly higher amount of games than the value for market efficiency, of 50%, this 
strategy is not profitable.  In looking at the NBA betting market Paul and Weinbach 
(2005b) find multiple cases where betting on underdogs resulted in statistically higher 
than 50% winning wagers, but only betting on home underdogs, who are expected to lose 
by more than ten points, was the only strategy that was profitable.   
Another anomaly discussed in the betting literature, is the argument of the hot-
hand, which was first looked at by Gilovich et al. (1985).  The thought here is that bettors 
overweight the situation that winners will continue winning and losers will continue 
losing, the latter is generally referred to as the cold hand.  Gilovich et al. (1985) create an 
experiment allowing players and observers to bet on a player‟s performance while he 
shoots free throws.  They observe that both players and observers make larger bets after 
the player has made a successful basket, which is consistent with the hot-hand theory, but 
the bet size and actual outcome are uncorrelated.  Extending Gilovich et al.‟s work, 
Camerer (1989) investigates the hot-hand theory on professional betting markets and 
finds that the market is influenced by the hot-hand phenomenon; however, the error is not 
profitable.  Brown and Sauer (1993b) reexamine Camerer‟s findings, using more 
strenuous testing, and find convincing evidence that the hot hand affects the SL betting 
market, resulting in their inability to reject Camerer‟s hypothesis that the SL is “affected 
by mythical hot hand beliefs.”  Nevertheless, their results could not be shown to be 
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consistent with “real hot hand effects in the score differences.”  Paul and Weinbach 
(2005b) look at the strategy of betting against teams on a winning streak and find this 
strategy does not only result in the rejection of a fair bet, it is also statistically profitable, 
supporting the notion that bettors overweight the hot hand.  However, Paul et al. (2004) 
find that the market acts efficiently when incorporating winning and losing streaks into 
NBA TL. 
At present, it appears that the idea of investigating multiple betting lines to assess 
the potential impact that they may have on each other has, in fact, not been researched.  
With that said, Borghesi and Dare (2009) and Dare and Dennis (2011) use the SL and TL 
to compare actual team performance relative to the market‟s expectations of team 
performance.  Borghesi and Dare (2009) investigate whether point shaving occurs in 
NCAA basketball.
15
  They test whether favorites tend to slack on defense, which would 
be preferred to slacking on offense when shaving points.  They conclude that favorites 
are the least likely to slack at defense and conclude anomalies in the betting market are 
not the result of point shaving, but are more likely the result of coaching strategies, such 
as resting star players in games where the team is up by a large amount.  By examining 
each team‟s performance in comparison to the expected scores, Dare and Dennis (2011) 
are able to show that the home underdog bias is strictly a downward bias on home 
underdogs and not a bias against away favorites.   
This paper is similar to Colquitt et al. (2001), in that they use the NCAA 
basketball betting market to look at efficiency differences across conferences and 
compare it to efficiency differences seen across stock exchanges.  Previous research has 
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 For more research related to college basketball and point shaving see Wolfers (2006) and Paul and 
Weinbach (2011). 
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shown greater availability of fundamental information for stocks traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange than stocks traded on other markets.  As a result, Colquitt et al. (2001) 
look at unbiasedness across the different conferences in the NCAA betting market and 
argue that more information is available for games between teams in an elite conference 
than those in a non-elite conference.  The authors utilize the traditional unbiasedness test, 
originally used by Gander et al. (1988) and Sauer et al. (1988), and an examination of the 
absolute forecast errors.  While the results developed by Colquitt et al. using traditional 
unbiasedness tests show no bias across conferences, the absolute forecast errors are 
statistically smaller for the elite conferences. The authors conclude by saying the 
following: “Evidence supports conclusions reached in studies of stock markets suggesting 
that differences in fundamental information result in different relative pricing efficiencies 
across those markets.” 
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2.3 Data 
The data employed in this paper were provided by Sports Book Reviews and 
includes opening and closing sides line (SL), opening and closing totals line (TL), closing 
money line (ML), the game date, whether the game was played at a neutral site, and the 
actual final score for 14,510 NCAA DI games played during the 2007-2010 seasons.  The 
60 games which do not have an opening or closing SL (nor TL or ML) are, therefore, not 
included in the analysis. There are 1,903 games played at neutral sites.  When examining 
accuracy of the SL, the sample can be divided into 14 subgroups depending on the 
various betting lines available on each game.  For example, there are 19 games where the 
ML and TL were not offered and 21 games where the SL and TL were not available 
when the market opened but were eventually offered before tip-off yet the ML was never 
offered.   
In the sample, there are seven subgroups with more than five games comprising a 
total of 14,432 games. The seven subgroups, as well as their data population, are: 
1. ALLDATA: All betting lines are offered (12,235 games)  
2. NOOTL: Opening TL is not available16 (1,537 games)  
3. NOML: ML is not offered (100 games) 
4. NOTL: TL is not offered (480 games)  
5. NOOL: Opening TL and opening SL are not available (40 games)  
6. NOMLTL: ML and TL are not offered (19 games)  
7. NOOLML: Opening TL, opening SL, and ML are not available (21 games)  
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 While the opening TL is not offered a closing TL is, indicating that at some point the TL was introduced, 
but it is unclear how shortly after the market opens the line becomes available.   
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Only four subgroups have at least 100 games; the remaining ten subgroups have 40 
games or less and are, thus, removed from the dataset when examining market efficiency 
due to small sample size. Thus, a total of 14,352 of the original 14,510 games are 
included in the final sample to examine whether the market is efficient   
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the games by subgroups and by year while Table 
3 provides summary statistics on the closing SL and actual point spread from the favorite-
underdog prospective.  From Table 3, it can be seen that in all cases the standard 
deviation of the actual score is always larger than the standard deviation of the SL, 
consistent with the previous literature.   
It is important to note that of the 480 games where the TL is not offered, 471 of 
these games are in the beginning of the season before conference play.  When looking at 
games where only the opening TL is not offered, over 90% (1,391) of the games are in 
the 2010 season; the remaining games are in the 2009 season, except for one game in the 
2007 season.  These cases are most likely to occur at the beginning of the season and 
never occur for post-season tournaments in NCAA basketball in March and April when 
the betting market has its largest volume.
17
  The large increase in the delay of providing 
an opening TL may be an indication of the bookmaker realizing that there are bettors who 
are more informed than the bookmaker, causing the bookmaker to be unwilling to offer 
lines when uncertainty or information asymmetry is largest.   
A unique aspect of college basketball is the large number of neutral site games 
played throughout the season: neutral site games make up a little over 13 percent of the 
                                                          
17
 March Madness is considered to be one of the largest events in the betting markets around the world.  
It has been compared to generate the same amount of money as the Super Bowl, the event with the 
highest wagers every year.   
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games in the dataset.  All neutral site games occur in the beginning or end of the season, 
when many of the tournaments are played.  Also there are no neutral site games in 
January and February since all conference games are played at the home team‟s court.   
 
TABLE 2: Summary Statistics on Number of Observations 
This table breaks down the games played by subgroups and when games are played by 
year and month.  Each year represents the full season that includes November and 
December of that year and January, February, March and April of the following year.  TG 
represents the total number of games played and Neutral indicates that the games are 
played on a neutral court.   
TG Neutral ALLDATA NOOTL NOML NOTL NOOL NOMLTL NOOLML
2007 3523 470 3445 1 43 29 0 1 0
November 560 183 503 1 23 28 0 1 0
December 581 59 571 0 9 1 0 0 0
January 909 0 898 0 11 0 0 0 0
February 893 0 893 0 0 0 0 0 0
March 572 222 572 0 0 0 0 0 0
April 8 6 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
2008 3478 435 3375 0 21 63 0 1 0
November 487 162 431 0 7 30 0 1 0
December 591 31 549 0 9 33 0 0 0
January 988 0 987 0 1 0 0 0 0
February 906 0 902 0 4 0 0 0 0
March 500 238 500 0 0 0 0 0 0
April 6 4 6 0 0 0 0 0 0
2009 3719 491 3152 145 21 298 38 9 20
November 561 166 159 90 5 287 0 7 0
December 640 38 568 55 3 11 0 2 0
January 1035 0 979 0 12 0 5 0 17
February 951 0 915 0 0 0 33 0 3
March 528 284 527 0 1 0 0 0 0
April 4 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
2010 3790 507 2263 1391 15 90 2 8 1
November 577 174 180 312 9 60 0 6 0
December 676 40 159 491 0 21 0 1 1
January 1012 1 482 509 5 8 1 1 0
February 974 0 915 55 1 1 1 0 0
March 547 289 523 24 0 0 0 0 0
April 4 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 14510 1903 12235 1537 100 480 40 19 21
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2.4 Methodology 
A. Testing Accuracy in the Sides Line (SL) 
Here, three tests examine the accuracy of the SL under the different possible line 
offerings.  While there have been many papers that examine unbiasedness in the betting 
market, accuracy has not been a focal point of the literature.  The first test is a slightly 
modified version of a basic test for market unbiasedness: 
                                                           (5) 
In Equation (5) PS represents the actual point difference between the two teams at the 
end of the game and CSL represents the closing SL for each game.  The remaining four 
variables (SLNOOTL, SLNOOCTL, SLNOML, and SLNOOSL) all represent CSL 
multiplied by the respective dummy variable for missing betting information (opening 
TL, closing TL, ML, and opening SL) and  is a zero-mean random error term.  The 
intercept is suppressed to allow for the model to directly examine the accuracy of the SL 
when other lines are missing, by using joint tests of whether the parameter on SL in 
different subgroups is statistically different from one.
18
     
The expectation is that b0 is not significantly different from one, indicating for 
subgroup one the market is accurate.  The expectation for subgroup three, four, and six 
(NOML, NOTL and NOMLTL), is that the joint coefficients are significantly different 
from one for each subgroup, which would indicate that the market is not as accurate when 
the other lines are missing.  As for subgroups two, five, and seven (NOOTL, NOOL and 
NOOLML) no expectations are made, since it is unclear how the market will react to the 
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 The results from the model are qualitatively the same when the intercept is included. 
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introduction of lines, and it is unknown when the lines were introduced between the 
opening line and the closing of the betting window at the beginning of the game.   
The second test looks at the accuracy of the SL by examining the absolute 
forecast error.   The absolute forecast errors are calculated as follows: 
               (6) 
where PS and CSL are defined above.  The expectation is that the absolute forecast error 
is smaller when all the betting lines are offered, compared to when information is 
missing.  In order to test a difference in means, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is used 
because the absolute forecast error does not seem to be normally distributed.    
 The third test is nearly identical to the second test, but the forecast errors 
generated from Equation (5) are used instead of just the difference between the actual and 
the expected score, that is, the closing SL.  Here the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is 
used because even though the forecast errors from the model are assumed to be normally 
distributed, the absolute forecast errors are likely not normally distributed. 
For test three, the expectations are the same as in test two, that is, that the  
absolute forecast error is significantly larger for the subgroups missing betting lines when 
compared to subgroup one, where all lines exist. 
B. Testing Unbiasedness in Betting Market 
The second question examined is whether any increased accuracy in the SL that 
occurs when additional betting lines are present results in a reduction in any possible bias 
in the market?  While this paper is not the first to test unbiasedness markets in the betting 
market, it is the first to look at unbiasedness while considering the interaction between 
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betting lines.  Zuber et al. (1985), Gandar et al. (1988), and Sauer et al. (1988) utilize the 
following basic test of unbiasedness in the betting market:
19
  
                (7) 
where PS and CSL are the same as described above, and  is a zero-mean random error.   
Unbiasedness implies that the following joint hypothesis test cannot be rejected:      
and     .
20
  When using this simple test, the order of which team comes first in the 
calculation of PS is important because, as pointed out by Gandar et al. (1988), the model 
is sensitive to which approach is used.  In developing this test there are three approaches:  
(1) home minus away, (2) favorite minus underdog, and (3) a random method.
21
  When 
using the home-away approach, games played at neutral sites are dropped from the 
analysis while in the favorite-underdog approach “pick-em games”, that is, games where 
no team is a favorite, are dropped from the analysis.  Here, the tests are run using both the 
home-away method and the favorite-underdog method.     
Dare and MacDonald (1996) address the issues with using Eq. 7 and develop a 
model that incorporates all five possible types of games: 
1. Favored-home team plays underdog-away team 
2. Favored away team plays underdog-home team 
3. Pick-em home team plays pick-em away team 
4. Favored team plays underdog team on neutral site 
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 This test has been criticized in the literature for not being a valid test of market efficiency.  The claim of 
being unbiased is not a sufficient condition for market efficiency.  See Russo et al. (1989), Even and Noble 
(1992), and Gandar et al. (1993) 
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 Zuber et al. (1985) point out that an alternative test would be that b0 = b1 = 0, indicating the SL has no 
impact on actual point difference. 
21
 Golec and Tamarkin (1991) try to control for the bias of using home-away or favorite-underdog by 
randomly using the home or favorite differencing method on each observation.  The problem with this 
approach is each run of the test yields different results.   
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5. Pick-em teams play on neutral site 
By using the favorite-underdog difference when possible and using dummy variables for 
favored, underdog, home, away, pick-em, and neutral site games, five equations can be 
generated, one for each type of game.  These models can be reduced into the following 
single equation: 
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where PS and CSL are as described above.  The superscripts indicate the perspective of 
the line, e.g., FH represents favored teams that play on their home court (FA = favored 
away team and FN = favored team at neutral site).  PN represents pick-em games played 
on neutral court, a case where there is neither a favorite nor a home team; as a result, the 
differencing approach is arbitrary.  As a result, Dare and MacDonald subtract the score of 
the visiting team, listed by the betting line, from the home team, listed by the betting line.  
The test of market unbiasedness is:   
    
    
    
    
    
    and, 
jointly,   
   .  The authors test their model using NFL and NCAA football betting data 
but acknowledge that the model can be used to investigate any betting market with 
favorite and home team characteristics.   
Dare and MacDonald is not the only paper to derive an alternative model to 
address the problems inherent in the basic unbiasedness test.  Even and Noble (1996) 
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used a likelihood ratio statistic to look at the probability of PS exceeding the closing SL.  
If the market is unbiased, the probability should be 0.5.  The authors use a likelihood 
ratio test because it does not impose equal median and mean on the forecast errors.  The 
likelihood ratio statistic for the null hypothesis that the probability of PS > SL is 0.5 is: 
                                              , (9) 
where    is the unrestricted log-likelihood function,    is the restricted log-likelihood, N 
is the total number of observations, n is the number of observations where PS > SL, and   
is the observed proportion of observations where PS > SL (i.e.      ).  The likelihood 
ratio statistic has a χ
2
 distribution with one degree of freedom.   
Gandar et al. (1993) show that the likelihood ratio statistic in Even and Noble 
(1996) is nearly similar to a Z
2
-test statistic.  Gandar et al., however, go one step further 
to show that a modest improvement occurs when changing the denominator in the 
standard Z-statistic from the null hypothesis variance              to the sample 
variance           , resulting in a (Z‟)2-test statistic that takes the following from: 
            
             , (10) 
where        when testing that the null hypothesis of an unbiased market.  Gandar et 
al. (1993) show that their (Z‟)
2
-test does result in a slightly more power test to reject a 
false null hypothesis than the Even and Noble log-likelihood test.  In both Even and 
Noble‟s likelihood ratio statistic, and in Gandar et al.‟s (Z‟)
2
-test statistic, the test is 
performed using the favorite-underdog method and the home-away method. 
To test the impact of the additional lines, TL and ML, the four tests above are run 
using the four subgroups discussed in section 2.3.  This allows one to see the impact that 
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these additional lines have on the SL and whether these additional betting lines actually 
result in more accurate and unbiased results. 
By using the ALLDATA subgroup in the above basic model, and the Dare and 
MacDonald model, the TL and ML can be included in the model directly to see if the 
information in these lines is already included in the SL.  In taking this approach, the ML 
is incorporated as a probability.  As a result, Eq. 7 becomes: 
                         , (11) 
where MLP indicates the probability, calculated from the ML, of the home (favored) 
team winning, and CTL is the closing TL.  Unbiasedness would imply that       
     and, jointly,     .  Looking at the Dare and MacDonald model, Eq. 8 now 
becomes the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
    
    
    
    
     
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
     
     
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
      
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
     
     
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
       
 
     
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
      
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
      
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
    
 
 
 
 
  , (12) 
where MLP
jk
 indicates the probability, calculated from the ML, of team k winning with j 
being the differencing method and CTL is the closing TL.  The test of market 
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unbiasednessis:   
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    and, 
jointly,   
   .   
The results of the above tests are presented and discussed in the following section. 
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2.5 Results for Accuracy in Sides Line 
The results from using the altered basic model for market unbiasedness, Equation 
(5), are provided in Table 4.  The results provide weak evidence that for subgroup NOTL, 
that is, when the totals line (TL) is not offered, the sides line (SL) is less accurate: The 
slope coefficient is statistically greater than one at the 10% level.  No other subgroup has 
a coefficient that is statistically different from one.  The expectation was that a missing 
TL would result in a less accurate SL.  Additionally, it is not surprising to see that the 
subgroups that were missing opening lines, NOOTL and NOOL, do not result in a less 
accurate SL.  This is likely the result of the market reacting to the release of the 
information and reflecting accurate SL by the closing of the market.  Since it is unknown 
when the exact release of the lines is, it is not possible with the current data to estimate 
how quickly the market does react to this information. 
The more intriguing finding is that there is no difference in the accuracy of the SL 
in either subgroup NOML or NOMLTL, both of which were expected to yield less 
accurate SL.  It was expected that a missing ML would result in a less accurate SL 
because of the reduced amount of information available to market participants.  
Moreover, subgroup NOOLML does not have a coefficient different from one as 
expected.  Finally, among the games missing both the ML and the TL, there seems to be 
no reduction in unbiasedness. One possible explanation for this is the small size of this 
subgroup (19 games).  In section 2.7, a closer examination of the relationship between the 
ML and the SL is provided to offer additional insight into why the accuracy of the SL is 
unaffected by the ML. 
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TABLE 4: Basic Model Result for Accuracy 
The results from Eq. 5 in the paper are presented below using robust standard errors and 
from a favorite-underdog prospective.  The F Tests are testing that the intercept forth 
subgroup is not different from one. 
Variable Coefficient p-value
CSL 0.988 *** 0.000
SLNOOTL -0.032 0.274
SLNOCTL 0.115 ** 0.014
SLNOML -0.051 0.337
SLNOOSL 0.104 0.352
F-Statistic 2377.00 *** 0.000
R2 0.468
F Tests Subgroup Coefficient p-value
CSL=1 ALLDATA 1.41 0.236
CSL+SLNOOTL=1 NOOTL 2.57 0.109
CSL+NOOTL+NOOSL=1 NOTL 0.30 0.584
CSL+NOML=1 NOML 1.44 0.230
CSL+NOOTL+NOCTL=1 NOOL 3.41 * 0.065
CSL+NOOTL+NOCTL+NOML=1 NOMLTL 0.11 0.735
CSL+NOML+NOOTL+NOOSL=1 NOOLML 0.01 0.935
*, **,  and *** indicates statistically significant from null at 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels.  
 
The results when using absolute forecast errors are provided in Table 5.  The 
results from both measures of absolute forecast errors are nearly identical and are similar 
to the other accuracy test.  Here, the only absolute forecast errors that are statistically 
different are found in subgroup NOTL, that is, when no TL is offered.  These absolute 
forecast errors are significantly different from the absolute forecast error when all betting 
lines are offered at the 10% level.  Overall, there is evidence that the SL is not as accurate 
when the TL is not offered, but that the SL is unaffected when the ML is not offered.   
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TABLE 5: Absolute Forecast Error Results for Accuracy 
Panel A provides the results from the mean difference test on the absolute forecast errors, 
where the forecast error is just the difference is actual points scored minus the expected 
points scored (closing sides line).  The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is used as a result 
of the distribution not being normal.  Panel B provides the results from the mean 
difference test on the absolute forecast error, where the forecast errors are the errors from 
Eq. 5.  Here too the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is used. 
Subgroup 1 Subgroup 2 Z p-value
ALLDATA NOOTL -0.649 0.516
ALLDATA NOML -1.066 0.287
ALLDATA NOTL -1.822 * 0.069
ALLDATA NOOL 0.824 0.410
ALLDATA NOMLTL -1.332 0.183
ALLDATA NOOLML 0.421 0.674
Subgroup 1 Subgroup 2 Z p-value
ALLDATA NOOTL -0.684 0.494
ALLDATA NOML -0.879 0.380
ALLDATA NOTL -1.832 * 0.067
ALLDATA NOOL 0.673 0.501
ALLDATA NOMLTL -1.369 0.171
ALLDATA NOOLML 0.404 0.687
*, **,  and *** indicates statistically significant from null at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Panel A
Panel B
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2.6 Results from Market Unbiasedness 
In general, the results across all models seem to conclude that any unbiasedness in 
the SL is unaffected by the existence of additional betting lines.  This means that the 
more accurate pricing of the SL when the TL is available does not result in an effect in 
the unbiasedness tests – any affect it may have on unbiasedness is too small to be 
measured using these tests. 
A. Basic Model 
Results from the basic model are found in Table 6, with Panel A displaying 
results from the home-away differencing approach (HADA) and Panel B containing the 
results from the favorite-underdog differencing approach (FUDA).
22
  One of the first 
things to notice is that the results are similar for both differencing approaches, which is 
not the case in other studies.
23
  One surprising result is that for the subgroup ALLDATA, 
where all three betting lines exist, the coefficient on the intercept is different from zero at 
the 1% level using the HADA and at the 5% level using the FUDA.  One might expect 
that this subgroup would be the least likely to have a bias because it is the subgroup with 
the most information freely available to market participants, but under both approaches it 
is not strictly unbiased.  In addition, under both approaches the subgroup where the TL is 
not offered when the market opens (NOOTL) and the subgroup where the ML is not 
offered (NOML) are the two cases in both differencing approaches where one cannot 
reject the null of an unbiased market.  In the subgroup, where the TL is not offered  
                                                          
22
 The Dare and MacDonald tests are reported with robust standard errors as a result of finding 
heteroscedasticity, using the Cameron-Trivedi decomposition.  However, heteroscedasticity was not 
found in the basic model.  As a result robust standard errors are not needed.  
23
 Gandar et al. (1988) note that their results are dependent on the differencing method used. 
39 
 
T
A
B
L
E
 6
: 
B
as
ic
 M
o
d
el
 R
es
u
lt
s 
fo
r 
M
ar
k
et
 U
n
b
ia
se
d
n
es
s 
 P
an
el
 A
 a
n
d
 B
 p
ro
v
id
e 
th
e 
re
su
lt
s 
o
f 
th
e 
b
as
ic
 m
o
d
el
 (
E
q
. 
7
).
  
P
an
el
 A
 p
ro
v
id
es
 t
h
e 
re
su
lt
s 
u
si
n
g
 t
h
e 
H
A
D
A
. 
 P
an
el
 B
 p
ro
v
id
es
 t
h
e 
re
su
lt
s 
u
si
n
g
 t
h
e 
F
U
D
A
. 
 A
L
L
D
A
T
A
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 a
ll
 b
et
ti
n
g
 l
in
es
 a
re
 o
ff
er
ed
, 
N
O
T
L
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 t
h
e 
T
L
 w
as
 n
o
t 
o
ff
er
ed
 w
h
en
 m
ar
k
et
 
o
p
en
ed
 b
u
t 
is
 o
ff
er
ed
 b
y
 t
ip
-o
ff
 (
m
ar
k
et
 c
lo
se
s)
, 
N
M
L
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 n
o
 M
L
 w
as
 o
ff
er
ed
, 
an
d
 N
T
L
 i
n
d
ic
at
es
 n
o
 T
L
 w
as
 o
ff
er
ed
. 
 T
h
e 
n
u
ll
 
h
y
p
o
th
es
is
 i
s 
β
0
 =
 0
 a
n
d
 β
1
 =
 1
. 
  
P
an
el
 C
 l
o
o
k
s 
at
 s
u
b
g
ro
u
p
 A
L
L
D
A
T
A
 a
n
d
 i
n
cl
u
d
es
 M
L
P
, 
th
e 
cl
o
si
n
g
 M
L
 o
f 
th
e 
h
o
m
e/
fa
v
o
ri
te
 l
is
te
d
 
as
 a
 p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
, 
an
d
 T
L
, 
th
e 
cl
o
si
n
g
 T
L
, 
in
to
 t
h
e 
m
o
d
el
 (
E
q
. 
1
1
).
  
T
h
e 
n
u
ll
 f
ro
m
 P
an
el
 A
 a
n
d
 B
 a
re
 s
ti
ll
 t
h
e 
sa
m
e,
 b
u
t 
th
e 
n
u
ll
 o
n
 b
o
th
 
ad
d
it
io
n
al
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
ar
e 
as
 f
o
ll
o
w
s 
β
3
 =
 0
 a
n
d
 β
4
 =
 0
. 
 T
h
e 
jo
in
t 
te
st
 f
o
r 
ea
ch
 m
o
d
el
 i
s 
th
e 
n
u
ll
 f
o
r 
ea
ch
 p
an
el
 j
o
in
tl
y
 t
es
te
d
. 
40 
T
A
B
L
E
 6
: 
(C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
) 
41 
(NOTL), the coefficient of the closing line is significantly different than one at the 5% 
level using both differencing approaches.  These results indicate that the offering of the 
other lines using the basic unbiasedness test does not impact the SL. 
When MLP and CTL are included into the basic model, the R
2
 for both 
differencing approaches remains unchanged and, as expected, these variables are not 
individually or jointly significant.  This indicates that both the ML and the TL are 
incorporated into the SL.  The result using the simple unbiasedness test shows that 
information provided by the other lines (ML and TL) is in fact incorporated into the SL. 
B. Dare and MacDonald Model 
The results using the Dare and MacDonald model are provided in Table 7.  Panel 
A runs the model on the four subgroups of data.  Looking at subgroup ALLDATA, where 
the expectation is that the market should result in the most accurate SL, one can reject the 
null of the coefficients being jointly different from zero at the 5% level, indicating the 
market is biased.  In the subgroup NOML, one can reject the null that the coefficients are 
jointly different from zero at the 1% level.  The interesting result in this model comes 
from the subgroups NOOTL and NOTL.  Here, one fails to reject the null that the 
coefficients are jointly different from zero.  Since in all subgroups one fails to reject 
  
   , these results imply that when the TL is not offered, or is introduced after the 
market opens there is no unbiasedness in the market.  However, there is biased when all 
lines are offered, and when the ML is not offered.  As a result, it is unclear whether the 
additional betting lines result in a reduction in the SL bias.  While it cannot be said that 
these other betting lines have no impact, the results from the Dare and MacDonald model  
42 
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do not indicate that the SL betting market is less biased as a result of the TL and ML 
being offered. 
Panel B of Table 5 includes the closing TL value as well as the addition of the 
ML, using h2, f2, n2 and p2, in the model. Here, one rejects the joint test that   
    
  
  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    and   
   .  This indicates 
that the market is biased and the information revealed in the ML and the TL is not 
incorporated into the SL.  However, the Adjusted R
2
 is unaffected implying that the 
information from the ML and the TL is already incorporated into the SL.  As a result, the 
information revealed in the ML and the TL is not incorporated into the SL. 
C. (Z‟)2-Test and the Likelihood Ratio Test 
Both of these tests follow a χ
2
 distribution and yield nearly identical results.  
However, Gandar et al. (1993) show that their (Z‟)
2
-test does result in a power test to 
reject a false null hypothesis.  The results from both models are in Table 8.  
In Panel B where pushes, games where the actual spread is equal to the closing 
SL, are removed, results for home and away/favorite and underdog teams have the same 
(Z‟)
2
-test and likelihood ratio.
24
  When pushes are included, the home team seems to win 
at a statistically higher rate than 50% in all but the NOML subgroup.  In the subgroup 
ALLDATA, the favorite and, hence, the underdog, both win at a rate significantly 
different from 50%.  It seems that these results are significantly influenced by the pushes, 
since in the ALLDATA sample both favorite and underdog win 5,869 games respectfully, 
which includes 239 games where pushes occur.  As a result, Panel B seems to be a more 
efficient examination of these two models. 
                                                          
24
 This is not the case when pushes are included because the sum of the probability of either team 
winning does not add to one. 
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TABLE 8: (Z‟)
2
-Test and the Likelihood Ratio Test for Market Unbiasedness 
This table presents the results of the Even and Noble (1992) Likelihood Ratio and the 
Gandar et al. (1993) modified square of the standard Z-test.  Panel A includes pushes, 
when the SL equals the actual spread, while Panel B removes pushes, which results in 
home and away/favorite and underdog having the same likelihood ratio and (Z')
2
 test.  
Both follow a χ
2
 distribution with one degree of freedom: critical values are 2.7055 (10% 
level), 3.8415 (5% level), and 6.6349 (1% level) 
Home Favorite Home Favorite Home Favorite Home Favorite
LR 28.839 *** 6.071 ** 4.892 ** 2.610 1.333 0.654 4.333 ** 0.356
(Z')2 28.904 *** 6.074 ** 4.906 ** 2.614 1.349 0.657 4.375 ** 0.356
Away Underdog Away Underdog Away Underdog Away Underdog
LR 0.530 6.071 ** 0.205 0.016 0.892 0.368 1.829 2.025
(Z')2 0.530 6.074 ** 0.205 0.016 0.899 0.369 1.836 2.032
Home Favorite Home Favorite Home Favorite Home Favorite
LR 9.509 *** 0.000 1.817 0.566 1.113 0.506 3.004 * 1.039
(Z')2 9.517 *** 0.000 1.819 0.566 1.125 0.508 3.025 * 1.041
*, **, and *** indicates statistically significant from null at, 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Panel B
ALLDATA NOTL NOML NOTL
Panel A
ALLDATA NOTL NOML NOTL
 
 
In Panel B, favorites do not win at a rate higher than 50% in any of the subgroups 
– while home teams win at a significantly greater than 50% rate in the ALLDATA and 
NOTL subgroups, at the 1% and 10% level respectively.  One interpretation of these 
results is that there is a possible home team bias in both subgroups.  The rejection of 
market unbiasedness in the ALLDATA subgroup is rather surprising since the 
ALLDATA subgroup contains games in which the market should have no bias because of 
the greater amount of freely available information provided to market participants. 
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2.7 Relationship between the Money Line and the Sides Line 
Up to now, the relationship between TL and SL has been the focus with no 
discussion about the relationship between the ML and the SL.  The ML can be used to 
calculate the subjective probability of each team winning and the SL provides the market 
expectation of how much the favorite team will win by, referred to as the point spread.
25
 
Each additional half point in the point spread should result in a stepwise increase in the 
subjective probability of the favorite team winning. This is because there is no magic 
point spread where each additional increase in the spread results in a larger or smaller 
probability of the favorite winning.  As a result, there should be a linear relationship 
between the ML and the SL.  This linear relationship is similar to the security market line 
(SML) in financial markets where one can view the point spread as the measure of risk 
one is taking when betting in the money line.  From the SML prospective, the return, 
which is the payoff for the wager in the ML, should linearly adjust with the amount of 
risk of the outcome occurring.  The measure of risk can be measured in the betting 
market by looking at the SL, where a higher SL implies smaller risk when betting on the 
favorite and larger risk when betting on the underdog.   
Using the ALLDATA subgroup, subjective and objective probabilities of the 
favorite winning are calculated for each SL.  While the subjective probability is derived 
from the ML, the objective probability is just the observable probability.  Here one can 
calculate the objective probability of the favorite (underdog) winning is by dividing the 
number of games where the favorite (underdog) wins for a given SL (ML) by the total 
                                                          
25
 A subjective probability is a probability that is derived from one’s judgment of the likelihood of an 
outcome to occur.  In this case  it is the market’s judgment and in section I the calculation on how to 
derive these subjective probabilities from the money line is discussed 
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number of games played with the same SL (ML).  Figure 1 plots the subjective and 
objective probability for each SL. It is quite obvious that the relationship is not linear; 
each additional half point increase in the SL does not result in a constant increase in the 
probability of winning and vice versa.  As a result, different ML may provide more 
information than other ML.  In fact, the relationship is best fit by a linear regression 
model until the SL reaches seven, after which each half point increase in the SL has a 
diminishing, but positive, impact on the probability of the favorite winning, resulting in 
the quadratic model being a better fit.
26
  Results from the linear and quadratic models are 
presented in Table 9.  This breakdown in the linear relationship is a likely reason that the 
existence of the ML has no impact on the accuracy of the SL.  From this finding, it 
becomes an interesting question to see if all the information in the SL is fully reflected in 
the ML.  However this question is left for future research. 
Additionally, in Figure 1, the objective probability for each SL is plotted.  In all 
but two cases the objective probability is larger than the subjective probability.  This may 
possibly be explained in that bettors are more likely to wager on the underdog, especially 
when the underdog is a heavy underdog, expected to lose by a large margin.  Also when 
the SL is in the neighborhood of seven points, this difference seems to become larger, 
implying that the bookmaker may be offering a discount on the ML for the favorite – 
perhaps to entice bettors to make a wager on the favorite.  A ML wager on a ten point 
favorite is likely to pay $100 on a $500 to $600 wager.  It may be at this point that the 
cost of making a wager on the favorite becomes less appealing, does not offer a high 
                                                          
26
 The Adjusted R
2
 is utilized to examine the best fit between the linear and quadratic models.  All 
observations at or below the specified SL are used. 
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enough return, and, as a result, the bookmaker provides a discount on the amount needed 
to wager in order to win $100.   
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Constant 0.4781 *** 0.4790 ***
FSL 0.0372 *** 0.0365 ***
FSL2 0.0001 ***
Adj. R2 0.9744 0.9744
Obs. 5832 5832
Constant 0.4789 *** 0.4772 ***
FSL 0.0369 *** 0.0380 ***
FSL2 -0.0001 ***
Adj. R2 0.9781 0.9781
Obs. 6270 6270
Constant 0.4800 *** 0.4754 ***
FSL 0.0365 *** 0.0394 ***
FSL2 -0.0004 ***
Adj. R2 0.9800 0.9803
Obs. 6693 6693
Constant 0.4810 *** 0.4743 ***
FSL 0.0361 *** 0.0403 ***
FSL2 -0.0005 ***
Adj. R2 0.9818 0.9824
Obs. 7064 7064
Panel A: SL ≤ 6
         Linear Model Quadratic Model
Panel B: SL ≤ 6.5
         Linear Model Quadratic Model
*, **, and *** indicates statistically significant 
from null at, 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Panel C: SL ≤ 7
         Linear Model Quadratic Model
Panel C: SL ≤ 7.5
         Linear Model Quadratic Model
Table 9: Linear and Quadratic Output of the Sides Line and Money Line Relationship 
 
The results provided below are for the linear and quadratic OLS models that look at the 
relationship between the SL and the ML. 
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2.8 Conclusion 
This paper examines the implications of missing betting lines on the accuracy of 
the SL.  Additional betting lines provide freely available and unique information to 
market participants that otherwise is not offered. When the information is freely available 
to market participants it might impact the accuracy of the SL.  In this paper, evidence is 
provided indicating that the omission of the TL results in less accurate SL.  While similar 
results are not found when there is the omission of the ML or the ML and TL jointly 
missing, possible explanations have been provided to explain these occurrences.  
However, when examined by previous unbiasedness tests, they seem to be uninfluenced, 
indicating any increase in accuracy does not yield a more unbiased SL. 
One question is why the additional information does not impact the market as 
intuition would predict? A possible explanation is that the information embodied in the 
additional lines is provided by the bookmakers free of charge to actual and potential 
market participants. For games in which the information embodied in the TL is not of 
high value, that is, when the accuracy of the SL will not be dramatically altered, the 
bookmaker might be more prone to revealing this information to all participants. On the 
other hand, if the information is of high value to the bookmaker, and they are confident 
that their information is superior to that of market participants, then it might be profitable 
for the bookmaker to not provide the information embodied in the TL. The bookmaker 
can take advantage of this information asymmetry by not revealing the TL. This is clearly 
an avenue for future investigation. 
52 
While previous literature has examined betting line unbiasedness, this is the first 
paper to examine unbiasedness while considering the potential impact other betting lines 
could have on each other.   
This paper provides the groundwork for future investigations for examining the 
role and relationship between betting lines.  While this paper looks at the impact of the 
TL and the ML on the SL, further investigation into their impact on each other in other 
betting markets other than NCAA DI basketball is warranted.  Betting market research 
provides a good environment to look at specific finance questions, especially because of 
the natural maturity date that occurs in the betting market.   Finally, this paper adds 
significant value into the betting market literature in finding that the linear relationship 
expected between the ML and the SL seems to breakdown once there is a heavy favorite, 
a team favored to win by at least seven points.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: DOES WINNING REALLY MATTER? AN EXAMINATION OF EPL  
CLUB PERFORMANCE AND EARNINGS 
Most publicly-traded companies release information concerning their financial 
performance four times a year. These quarterly financial reports typically represent the 
only detailed performance information available to the public concerning these publicly-
traded companies.  However, in the case of publicly-traded sports teams, performance, in 
terms of success or failure on the field of play, is reported on a daily or weekly basis and 
is, therefore, easily measured.  With the advantage of readily available performance 
information, investors of a publicly-traded sports club might react immediately to the 
wins and losses of the club.  As a result, publicly-traded sports club data has been utilized 
in recent years to examine investor sentiment and market efficiency.  While the general 
argument is that stock prices of publicly-traded sport clubs will react positively to a win 
and negatively to a loss, this will only be true if winning influences a club‟s profitability.  
Results from such studies provide unique insight into the more general issue of investor 
sentiment and market efficiency. 
While the stock price of a sports club might be of interest, the underlying question 
of whether a sports club‟s performance influences its financial statement seems to have 
been sidestepped.
27
  Financial theory suggests a correlation between investment value and 
firm performance.  The difficulty, however, arises in interpreting a firm‟s performance.  
                                                          
27
 Szymanski and Smith (1997) find a positive relationship between log of profit margin (revenue/cost) and 
performance on the field but do not directly test the significance of this relationship.   
54 
 
While the release of a new product or service may be interpreted as good news, the 
information is never black and white.  Sports clubs have the unique nuance of providing 
clear market signals about performance, where winning is good and losing is bad.  Also, 
in sports the information is available to everyone at the exact same time; there is no 
concern of the information being leaked early to certain investors.  Yet, if a win or loss 
does not affect a club‟s income then it should not have a fundamental impact on the 
club‟s stock price.  This relates directly to Fama‟s (1970) definition of market efficiency: 
A market in which prices always „fully reflect‟ available information is called „efficient‟.  
As a result, if a given win or loss does not affect the team‟s financial fundamentals, then, 
under market efficiency, one would not expect the stock price to react to the game 
outcome either.  Intuition suggests that as a club wins more games, its potential for 
advancing into the playoffs is increased, which, in turn, further increases its ability to 
generate a larger profit, conditional on players‟ salaries being fixed in the short run.
28
  To 
the extent that success (winning games) increases a club‟s revenue through increased 
attendance, memorabilia sales, and perhaps sponsorship contracts, a club‟s success 
should be positively correlated with its stock price.  Using this intuition, this paper 
investigates the relationship between a sport club‟s performance and its operating 
                                                          
28
 Since Scully (1974) discusses the labor market in Major League Baseball (MLB) and finds a positive 
relationship between players’ pay and performance, there have been many discussions on a team’s 
performance and the pay it provides to its players.   Forrest and Simmons (2002b) test this relationship 
using the four major North American sports leagues and three European soccer leagues and, in general, 
find statistically significant support that club wages and club performance are related.  These results seem 
to indicate that it could be possible, especially for some clubs, that the cost of winning may exceed the 
revenues from winning.   
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income.
29
  The empirical evidence suggests that winning does, in fact, influence financial 
success of English soccer clubs but in different ways for elite and non-elite clubs.   
While operating income is affected differently across clubs, the market seems to 
consistently react positively to all wins and negatively to an elite club‟s international loss.  
While this falls in line with winning is good news and losing is bad news, it is interesting 
that all wins are treated the same regardless of the type of match, or if the club is elite or 
non-elite.   
  
                                                          
29
 Deadspin’s recent release of the financial statements of six Major League Baseball (MLB) clubs has 
sparked the debate of the relationship between a club’s field performance and financial performance.  
The statements were provided by an anonymous source, which later was revealed to be an insurance 
company.  The reports were released on August 23, 2010 and August 24, 2010 and contain the financial 
statements of the Florida Marlins, the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim, the Pittsburgh Pirates, the Seattle 
Mariners, the Tampa Bay Rays, and the Texas Rangers. Table 10 provides the operating income and net 
income of the six teams from the report.  The most intriguing information in the Deadspin report is that 
the Pittsburgh Pirates had been very profitable in the late 2000’s although the team won relatively few 
games; in fact, the Pirates have not had a winning season since 1992.  While these reports do not provide 
direct evidence that revenues and profitability in MLB are directly related to a club’s field performance, 
they do increase the debate about the relationship between winning and team profitability.   
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3.1 Literature Review 
While stock markets have been around for a long time, it is only recently that 
sports teams have made the decision to go public.  The Amsterdam Stock Market is the 
oldest stock market in the world, dating back to 1602, but the oldest publicly-traded team, 
Tottenham Hotspur (English soccer club), went public only in 1983.  This is likely the 
result of leagues and clubs not wanting to disclose their financial information to the 
general public, and that, until recently, the sports industry was not viewed as a big 
business.   
The seminal paper that looks at publicly-traded sports teams is Brown and 
Hartzell (2001). They look at how the stock price of the National Basketball 
Association‟s Boston Celtics reacted to the club‟s performance over a 12-year period of 
time.  They find that, while only regular season losses had a significant impact on stock 
price, both wins and losses in the postseason impact both stock price and volume.   
Since Brown and Hartzell (2001) there have been a number of papers that have 
investigated the relationship between a publicly-traded sports club‟s performance and the 
club‟s financial data.  In most cases, these studies focus on publicly-traded soccer clubs.  
Renneboog and Vanbrabant (2000) investigate 20 publicly-traded English and Scottish 
soccer clubs and find wins generate abnormal returns while draws and losses both 
generated negative abnormal returns.  They also note that most publicly-traded clubs 
underperform the market index and that many investors are fans who hold shares as a 
way of supporting their team.  Benkraiem et al. (2002) look at 18 publicly-traded 
European soccer clubs over the course of one year and find similar results to Renneboog 
and Vanbrabant – except they find no significant reaction to wins.  Benkraiem et al. 
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(2002) are the only authors to examine the effect of where the game is played (i.e. Home 
versus Away), and find home losses have a larger negative impact on stock returns than 
away losses.  Zuber et al. (2005) look at club performance and stock market data for ten 
English Premier League (EPL) clubs traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) over a 
period of three years.  They find that investors do not react to a soccer club‟s 
performance on the field, and argue that stockholders of EPL clubs are not typical 
investors, but are rather „investor-fans‟ who solely value the stock on the idea of 
ownership in the club.  Lastly, Stadtmann (2006) investigate the stock of Borussia 
Dortmund, a publicly-traded German soccer club, and its reaction to match outcomes.  
Results from this work are unable to reject the two hypotheses that winning a match 
positively influences the club‟s stock return and losing a match negatively influences the 
club‟s stock return.     
Palomino et al. (2009) and Bernile and Lyandres (2011) also examine the 
relationship between club performance on the field and club stock performance, but their 
focus is on investor sentiment.  Palomino et al. (2009) note that the market reacts faster to 
winning, interpreted as good news, than to losing, interpreted as bad news.   This finding 
is consistent with the previous literature that finds the market reacts to good news faster 
(see Chan 2003).  Remarkably, Palomino et al. (2009) observe that there is not a market 
reaction to the release of betting odds, even though they demonstrate betting odds are 
excellent predictors of game results.  Palomino et al. (2009) conclude that investor 
sentiment influences news absorption by stock market investors.  It is important to note 
that while Palomino et al. (2009) do not find a relationship between stock market prices 
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and betting odds, betting odds are used in almost all papers investigating the impact of 
game outcomes as proxy for ex ante market expectations.   
Bernile and Lyandres (2011) look at 20 European premier soccer clubs that are 
publicly-traded in an attempt to assess investor sentiment.  Their unique measure of 
investor sentiment allows them to show that pre-event stock prices do not reflect 
expected postgame prices.  They find investor sentiment is an ex-ante occurrence.  
Bernile and Lyandres (2011): “Findings are consistent with the hypothesis that pre-event 
stock prices are inefficient [and they] cannot reject the hypothesis that post-event prices 
are efficient.”  Lastly, Bernile and Lyandres find that market reaction to game outcomes 
is asymmetric; losses are associated with significantly negative postgame returns, while 
wins are followed by near-zero returns, which is consistent with the findings of Brown 
and Hartzell (2001) and Edmans et al. (2007).  Overall, it seems that investors 
overestimate the probability of winning ex ante.   
Similar to Palomino et al. (2009) and Bernile and Lyandres (2011), Edmans et al. 
(2007) investigate investor mood, by focusing on the relationship between national team 
matches and stock market reactions to these matches.  They argue that the mood of 
investors is affected by their national team performance.  They document a strong 
negative stock market reaction to losses by the national soccer teams, which are both 
economically and statistically significant, but the same is not found for wins.   
In the previous literature, all clubs have been treated as equals, that is, it is 
assumed that every club‟s intention is to win each game they play.  However, this may 
not always be the case, and this raises the question whether soccer clubs try to maximize 
profits or wins; the debate of businesses intentions is a central economic question.  
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Garcia-del-Barrio and Szymanski (2009) find Spanish and English clubs closely 
approximate win maximization subject to a zero-profit budget constraint.    When looking 
at competitive restraints (i.e. salary caps and revenue sharing), Fort and Quirk (1995) and 
Vrooman (1995) find competitive constraints raise clubs‟ profitability when clubs are 
profit maximizers, but Kesenne (1996 & 2000) treat clubs as win maximizers and gets 
different results.  Thus, the objective of the clubs can have a significant impact on 
competitive restraints implications.
30
   
  
                                                          
30
 Going back to the data in the Deadspin reports, the Pittsburgh Pirates have generated large profits 
without winning most of their games.  This brings into question whether all teams are trying to win every 
game.  In fact, it maybe that, for some clubs it is their intention to put together a weak team at low costs 
in order to generate large revenues from the diehard fans.  Better yet, is it possible that some clubs are 
win maximizers and some are profit maximizers? 
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3.2 Data  
A. Season Data 
The data used in this paper was obtained from the annual reports generated 
between 1992 and 2008 for 16 of the 17 publicly-traded EPL clubs on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE), PLUS Market Group (PZ), or Alternative Investment Market (AIM).
31
  
Operating income data for each club was gathered from Bloomberg, as well as, the 
annual UK Consumer Price Index (CPI).  Operating income is used instead of revenue, 
since revenues will be affected by the club‟s financial leverage.  For game results, 
competition, and location of match the following two sources were used: ESPN.com and 
statto.com.
 32
  All 16 clubs included in the analysis have fiscal years that end between 
May and July, which allows each soccer season to be reported annually; see Table 11 for 
a list of all 16 clubs.
33
   
In terms of competition, games were distinguished between regular season games 
(EPL, Football League Championship, or Football League Two) and games associated 
with the Football League Cup (FL Cup), Football Association Cup (FA Cup), 
Community Shield, Anglo-Italian Cup, Winners‟ Cup, Union of European Football 
Association (UEFA) Cup, Super Cup or Champions League.  The EPL is the premier 
soccer league in England while the Football League Championship is the second-best 
                                                          
31
 The PZ is a London-based security exchange formerly known as OFEX, which is a less liquid market than 
LSE.  The AIM is a part of the LSE, but is designed for small and growing companies, which results in the 
AIM having less restrictive listing requirements.  
32
 Data was collected from ESPN going back to the 2004-05 season.  This data was used to confirm the 
validity of statto.com to verify their results.  Statto.com is then used to get game results from 1992-93 to 
2003-04.   
33
 It should be noted that Birmingham City Football Club (FC) was left out of the analysis because their 
annual report ends on August 31
st
 which causes the first month of one season and nine months of another 
season to be combined in each annual report, which in term could cause misleading results.   
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soccer league in England, followed by the Football League Two.  The FA Cup and the FL 
Cup are knockout tournaments played in England between EPL teams and non-EPL 
English teams.  The FA Cup in recent years has seen a rapid increase in participating 
teams with 731 clubs competing in the 2007-08 FA Cup, while the FL Cup has 
consistently had only the top 92 England clubs.  The Community Shield is played 
annually between the champion of the EPL and the FA Cup winner.  The Anglo-Italian 
Cup was played periodically between 1970 and 1996.  In 1992, it became an international 
competition between second-tier English and Italian clubs, but was stopped due to match 
conflicts.  As a result, Anglo-Italian Cup games are included as international play, but are 
not included as international play when considering if a club is an elite club.  The 
Winners‟ Cup, UEFA Cup, and Champions League are played between the top European 
TABLE 11: EPL Publicly-Traded Clubs 
 
This table provides information on the 16 EPL clubs included in the data.  Below is 
each club's ticker symbol, years of available financials, years of international play 
between the 1992-93 season and the 2007-08 season, and club type. 
Club Ticker 
Yrs of Available Financial 
Reports 
Yrs of 
Int’l Play Club Type 
Arsenal AFC PZ 1998-2008 14 Elite 
Aston Villa ASV LN 1996-2006 6 Elite 
Chelsea  387382Q LN 1997-2004 2 Non-Elite 
Charlton CLO LN 1996-2002 12 Elite 
Leeds United LUFC LN 1993-1995 & 1997-2003 7 Elite 
Leicester City LCC LN 1998-2001 4 Non-Elite 
Manchester United MNU LN 1993-2004 16 Elite 
Manchester City MANV PZ 1998-2006 1 Non-Elite 
Newcastle United NCU LN 1996-2005 10 Elite 
Nottingham Forrest NGF LN 1998-2000 2 Non-Elite 
Sheffield United SUT LN 1993-2008 1 Non-Elite 
Southampton SOO LN 1996-20005 & 2007-2008 1 Non-Elite 
Sunderland SUA LN 1996-2005 1 Non-Elite 
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teams – the Champions League being the pinnacle of European Soccer.  In the ranking of 
the international cups, the Champions League is considered the highest level of 
international play, followed by the Winners‟ Cup, and then UEFA Cup.  The Winners‟ 
Cup was abolished to allow the Champions League to expand after the 1998-99 season.  
The elite European clubs that do not qualify for the Champions League play in the UEFA 
Cup.  Every year at least two of the top EPL teams qualify for the Champions League the 
following season.  Similar to the Community Shield, the Super Cup is played between the 
reigning champions of the Champions League and the UEFA Cup.   
For each season, the total number of games played, games won, lost and drawn 
for each type of game were collected.  In addition, each of the 16 club‟s longest losing 
streak during the regular season, where a draw or a win broke the losing streak, were 
recorded.  A team‟s losing streak is collected because fans might become less interested 
in a team if the team continues to lose consecutive games.  This is closely related to the 
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis (UOH) that argues that fans receive higher utility from 
matches where the clubs are closely balanced.    In other words, the more uncertain the 
outcome, the higher the expected attendance will be.  Jennett (1984), Peel and Thomas 
(1988), and Forrest and Simmons (2002a) all looked at the UOH as it relates to soccer 
and conclude that soccer supporters appear to prefer well-balanced matches. 
Also gathered were the total number of international games played and the total 
number of home games played during the entire season, excluding “friendly” matches in 
which data was not easily accessible.
34
   
  
                                                          
34
 A “friendly” match is where the outcome does not count towards the standings of the two clubs 
involved, commonly referred to as an exhibition game.   
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Table 12 provides descriptive details of the variables.  The sample period is from 
1992-2008; all variables have 156 observations.  The mean operating income, adjusted 
for inflation, is -£0.146 million, with a minimum and maximum of -£29.326 and £51.549 
million, respectively.  Operating income is adjusted by the UK CPI to control for 
inflation, so all figures are in terms of 2010 British pounds.  The mean for the dummy 
variable EPL is .718, indicating 71.8% of the season observations were of clubs 
competing in the EPL.  The mean winning percentage for the first half of the season (first 
half) for all clubs is .547, with a minimum of .263 and a maximum of .848.  The mean 
winning percentage for the first half multiplied by non-elite dummy variable
35
 
(NEHALF1) is .308, with the minimum of zero and a maximum of .760.  The mean 
winning percentage for the second half of the season (second half) for all clubs is .549, 
with the minimum of .029 and a maximum of .917.  The mean winning percentage for the 
second half multiplied by non-elite dummy (NEHALF2) is .301, with a minimum of zero 
and a maximum of .850.  The mean number of international matches played per season is 
2.86, with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 18.  The mean club‟s longest losing 
streak per season is 3.01, with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 15.  The mean 
number of home team matches that a team plays a season is 25.0, with a minimum of 19 
and a maximum of 34.  The means for the dummy variables concerning relegation and 
promotion are .071 and .083, respectively, indicating that there are 11 observations where 
the club was relegated down a league and 13 observations where the club was promoted 
up a league. 
  
                                                          
35
 The non-elite dummy variable takes a value of one if the club is elite and zero otherwise 
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TABLE 12: Seasonal Variables Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports variables definitions, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and 
maximum observation.   
Variable Definition Mean 
Std 
Dev Min Max 
OIADJ Operating income adjusted for 
inflation 
-0.146 12.518 -29.326 51.549 
HALF1 Winning percentage for league games 
played between August and 
December 
0.547 0.130 0.263 0.848 
NEHALF1 HALF1 multiplied by dummy variable 
that takes a value of 1 if club is not an 
elite club and zero otherwise 
0.308 0.264 0 0.759 
HALF2 Winning percentage for league games 
played between January and May 
0.549 0.155 0.029 0.917 
NEHALF2 HALF2 multiplied by dummy variable 
that takes a value of 1 if club is not an 
elite club and zero otherwise 
0.308 0.264 0 0.759 
IG Number of international games played 2.859 4.817 0 18 
NEIG IG multiplied by dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if club is not an elite 
club and zero otherwise 
0.301 1.425 0 10 
DG Number of games played in the FL Cup 
and FA Cup 
24.32 2.7776 19 33 
NEDG DG multiplied by dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if club is not an elite 
club and zero otherwise 
14.929 12.192 0 34 
PROMOTION Dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if club is promoted to the lower 
level the following year 
0.083 0.277 0 1 
RELEGATION Dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if club is relegated to the lower 
level the following year 
0.071 0.257 0 1 
EPL Dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if club played in EPL during the 
season and zero otherwise 
0.718 0.451 0 1 
LSTREAK Number of consecutive league games 
lost 
3.006 1.776 0 15 
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It is important to note that HALF1 and HALF2 have nearly identical averages, 
maximums and minimums.  The same can be noted for NEHALF1 and NEHALF2.  This 
implies that clubs tend to perform consistently over the entire season.   
B. Match Data 
Individual game data was collected for all 8,740 market reactions to a publicly-
traded club‟s match outcome from August 1992, the beginning of the 1992-1993 season, 
until May 2008, the end of the 2007-2008 season.  These matches represent all the 
matches played with at least one publicly-traded club that competed in at least one year in 
the EPL during this time horizon.  Of the 8,740 observations, betting market data is 
available for 5,879 observations, going back to the 1998-1999 season.  Of these 5,879 
match outcomes, 2,453 resulted in a publicly-traded club win, 1,885 resulted in a 
publicly-traded club loss, and the remaining 1,541 resulted in a draw.  Each match is 
classified into one of six categories: EPL (3,533), Division I (D1) (1,700), Division II 
(D2) (42), D1 Playoff (9), English knockout tournament (232), and international 
knockout tournament (363).  Additional match data includes the betting odds (from 
Betexplorer.com), date of match, goal differential, and where the match was played.  
Table 13 provides summary statistics on match outcomes.  Each day of week variable is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if the match was played on that day and a zero 
otherwise; SOCCERMONTH is the month of the year converted to correspond to the 
soccer season schedule, i.e. the first month of the soccer season is August so for all 
matches in August SOCCERMONTH takes a value of 1, for September a value of 2, and 
so forth until May for which SOCCERMONTH takes the value of 10 and is the last 
month of the season; HOME is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the   
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TABLE 13: Match Variable Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports variables definitions, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and 
maximum observation.   
Variable Definition Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
ACAR1 Abnormal cumulative abnormal return 
from close before match to first close 
after match 
0.000 0.036 -0.429 0.665 
ACAR2 Abnormal cumulative abnormal return 
from close before match to second close 
after match 
0.000 0.047 -0.407 0.842 
ACAR3 Abnormal cumulative abnormal return 
from close before match to third close 
after match 
0.000 0.056 -0.428 0.934 
WIN Dummy variable for if the publicly-
traded club won the match 
0.417 0.493 0.000 1.000 
LOSE Dummy variable for if the publicly-
traded club lost the match 
0.321 0.467 0.000 1.000 
DRAW Dummy variable for if the match ended 
as a draw (tie) 
0.262 0.440 0.000 1.000 
EWIN WIN variable multiplied by a dummy 
variable, ELITE, that takes a value of one 
if the club is an elite club and a zero 
otherwise 0.178 0.382 0.000 1.000 
ELOSE LOSE variable multiplied by a dummy 
variable, ELITE, that takes a value of one 
if the club is an elite club and a zero 
otherwise 0.089 0.285 0.000 1.000 
EDRAW DRAW variable multiplied by a dummy 
variable, ELITE, that takes a value of one 
if the club is an elite club and a zero 
otherwise 0.094 0.291 0.000 1.000 
IWIN WIN variable multiplied by a dummy 
variable, INTERNATIONAL, that takes a 
value of one if the match was played 
against a non-English club and a zero 
otherwise 0.033 0.179 0.000 1.000 
ILOSE LOSE variable multiplied by a dummy 
variable, INTERNATIONAL, that takes a 
value of one if the match was played 
against a non-English club and a zero 
otherwise 0.014 0.118 0.000 1.000 
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  TABLE 13 (continued) 
Variable Definition Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
IDRAW DRAW variable multiplied by a dummy 
variable, INTERNATIONAL, that takes a 
value of one if the match was played 
against a non-English club and a zero 
otherwise 0.014 0.119 0.000 1.000 
EIWIN WIN variable multiplied by ELITE and 
INTERNATIONAL variables 0.031 0.172 0.000 1.000 
EILOSE LOSE variable multiplied by ELITE and 
INTERNATIONAL variables 0.013 0.114 0.000 1.000 
EIDRAW DRAW variable multiplied by ELITE and 
INTERNATIONAL variables 0.013 0.115 0.000 1.000 
MONDAY Dummy variable that takes a value of 
one if the match is played on a Monday 
and a zero otherwise 0.057 0.232 0.000 1.000 
TUESDAY Dummy variable that takes a value of 
one if the match is played on a Tuesday 
and a zero otherwise 0.114 0.317 0.000 1.000 
WEDNESDAY Dummy variable that takes a value of 
one if the match is played on a 
Wednesday and a zero otherwise 0.096 0.294 0.000 1.000 
THURSDAY Dummy variable that takes a value of 
one if the match is played on a Thursday 
and a zero otherwise 0.022 0.146 0.000 1.000 
FRIDAY Dummy variable that takes a value of 
one if the match is played on a Friday 
and a zero otherwise 0.015 0.121 0.000 1.000 
SATURDAY Dummy variable that takes a value of 
one if the match is played on a Saturday 
and a zero otherwise 0.551 0.497 0.000 1.000 
SUNDAY Dummy variable that takes a value of 
one if the match is played on a Sunday 
and a zero otherwise 0.146 0.353 0.000 1.000 
HOME Dummy variable that takes a value of 
one if the match is played in the club's 
home stadium 0.499 0.500 0.000 1.000 
GOALDIFF Goals scored by the observed club minus 
the goals scored for the unobserved club 0.202 1.722 -7.000 8.000 
SOCCERMONTH Month of the season that the match was 
played in, with August equal to one and 
May equal to ten 5.176 2.872 1.000 10.000 
UNEXPLOSE Implies the club considered a heavy 
favorite (expected to win) according to 
the betting markets and loses 0.021 0.143 0.000 1.000 
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TABLE 13 (continued) 
Variable Definition Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
UNEXPWIN Implies the club considered a heavy 
underdog (expected to lose) according to 
the betting markets and wins 0.026 0.159 0.000 1.000 
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publicly-traded club is playing in their home stadium and a zero otherwise; EXPWIN 
(EXPLOSE) is a dummy variable that takes a value of one when the club is a heavy 
favorite (underdog) that loses (wins) and a zero otherwise.  A heavy favorite (underdog) 
is calculated from the betting odds where the club is one standard deviation above the 
mean for the probability of a win (loss).  In order to calculate the probability of each 
outcome occurring, the betting market data is converted into probabilities for each 
outcome.  Following Sauer (2005), the probability of each outcome can be calculated as 
the ratio of one to one plus the stated payout for the given outcome for all three possible 
outcomes,      
 
        
.  However, the three probabilities add up to greater than one, 
which is the result of the bookmakers not offering fair odds – they are in business to 
make a profit.  To account for this, the probabilities are normalized to obtain the 
subjective fair probability,      , obtained by dividing each nominal probability by the 
sum of the three probabilities.  The fair probabilities now add up to one.   
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3.3 Empirical Models 
A. Firm‟s Financial Impact from Game Outcome 
Since the data covers the sample period 1993-2008, all operating incomes are 
adjusted for inflation by using the UK CPI, with 2010 as the base year, yielding the 
variable, OIADJ, which is used as the dependent variable in the following empirical 
model:  
                                                       
                                               
                                          ,                          (13) 
where the β‟s are parameters to be estimated, the index i denotes the club, the index t 
denotes the year, and εit is a composite error term with a club specific effect, ci, and an 
independently and identically distributed two-sided error term, uit.   
The explanatory variables are designed to test how winning affects financial 
performance of the club, specifically if all clubs are identical in this aspect and whether 
matches earlier or later in the season influence clubs‟ financial performance differently.  
A club‟s regular season matches are divided into the club‟s first half winning percentage 
(HALF1) and the club‟s second half winning percentage (HALF2).
36
  Additionally, the 
clubs used in this paper are divided into two groups: elite clubs, which participated in 
international play at least four out of the 16 years, and non-elite clubs.
37
  The expectation 
                                                          
36
 HALF1 includes league games played from August to December while HALF2 includes league games 
played from January to May. 
37
 While 25% international participation rate seems rather arbitrary there seems to be a clear break in the 
number of seasons of international play, with elite clubs participating in at least 6 years of international 
play, while Tottenham, the non-elite club with the highest amount of international play, only had three 
seasons where they qualified for international play.  Additionally, no elite club was relegated from the EPL 
while publicly-traded; the only other club not relegated while publicly-traded is Tottenham, who has 
never been relegated from the EPL. 
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is that elite clubs are more likely to see on-field performance impact in their financials.  
For non-elite clubs, winning may not impact the financials of the club in the same manner 
as it does for elite clubs because of their lower status.  NEHALF1 (NEHALF2) is HALF1 
(HALF2) multiplied by a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the team is a non-
elite club and zero otherwise.  For international play and domestic cups, FA Cup and FL 
Cup, winning percentage is not used.  Instead, the number of matches played is 
employed.  This approach is used because clubs play a different number of matches, 
which could influence their winning percentage and put lower weight on each game the 
further they advance.  The only way to advance in international play and domestic cups is 
to win the previous round.  IG is the number of games played internationally and DG is 
the number of matches played in domestic cups.  Additionally, NEIG (NEDG) is IG (DG) 
multiplied by a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the team is a non-elite club 
and zero otherwise.   
The following variables are included as control variables.  PROMOTION 
(RELEGATION) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the club is promoted 
(relegated) the following year and a zero otherwise.  EPL is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if the club competes in the EPL that year and a zero otherwise.   
LSTREAK is the club‟s longest losing streak excluding non-regular season games for the 
season.   
With the four measures of performance for elite and non-elite clubs, there are 
several possible hypotheses for each variable; Table 14 provides a list of all hypotheses.  
Hypotheses one through six deal with performance in regular season matches, while 
hypotheses seven through 11 deal with domestic cups and international matches.  The 
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  TABLE 14: Hypotheses 
 
This table provides a list of the hypotheses being tested and the implication on the betas 
for each hypothesis. 
Hypothesis Summary Implications 
H1 League play impacts elite clubs' operating income β2 > 0  &  β4 > 0 
H1A 
The second half play has a larger impact on elite 
clubs' operating income β4 >  β2 > 0 
H2 
League play does not impact elite clubs' operating 
income β2 = 0  &  β4 = 0 
H3 
League play does not impact non-elite clubs' 
operating income β2 + β3 = 0  &  β4 + β5 = 0 
H4 
League play impacts non-elite clubs' operating 
income β4 + β5 > 0  &  β2 + β3 > 0 
H4A 
The second half play has a larger impact on non-elite 
clubs' operating income β2 + β3 > β4 + β5 > 0 
H5 
Elite clubs incur a larger impact from winning league 
matches than non-elite clubs 
β2 > β2 + β3  &  β4 > β4 + 
β5 
H6 
Non-elite clubs incur a larger impact from winning 
league matches than elite clubs 
β2 + β3 > β2  &  β4 + β5 > 
β4 
H7 
Winning international matches matters for both elite 
and non-elite clubs β6 > 0  &  β6 + β7 > 0 
H7A 
Elite clubs incur a larger impact from winning 
international matches than non-elite clubs β6 > β6 + β7 
H7B 
Non-elite clubs incur a larger impact from winning 
international matches than elite clubs β6 + β7 > β6 
H8 
Winning in domestic cups impact elite clubs' 
operating income β8 > 0 
H9 
Winning in domestic cups does not impact elite clubs' 
operating income β8 = 0 
H10 
Winning in domestic cups impact non-elite clubs' 
operating income β8 + β9 > 0   
H11 
Winning in domestic cups does not impact non-elite 
clubs' operating income β8 + β9 = 0   
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 first hypothesis, H1, posits that for elite clubs winning percentage for both halves of the 
season has a positive impact on operating income.  This is because elite clubs are the 
dominant clubs that intend to play internationally, which requires one of the best records 
in league play.  Taking this hypothesis one step further, H1A posits that the second half 
winning percentage has a greater impact on operating income than the first half winning 
percentage.  Although all games are equally weighted in the league standings, as the 
season unfolds, each game may be viewed as more significant, especially when teams are 
jockeying for final position to qualify for international play – or to avoid relegation to a 
lower division the following year.
38
  Hypothesis H2 argues the opposite of H1, i.e. that 
neither the first half or second half winning percentage has an impact on operating 
income.  This could be the result of elite clubs in larger cities having larger fan bases and, 
thus, do not need as much success in order to have a high attendance.  It could also be the 
result of elite fans caring more about international play than regular season play and thus 
winning in the regular season does not matter for elite clubs.  Additionally, H2 would be 
more in line with the findings of the UOH applied to soccer.   In this situation, fans would 
prefer to see more balanced games in comparison to seeing their club that wins every 
game.   
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 May 13, 2012 was the last day of the 2011-12 EPL season.  It also could be argued to be the most 
exciting final day of the EPL ever.  Going into the last day the championship was still up in the air with 
either Manchester City or Manchester United winning, but that was just the tip of the iceberg into the 
impact of positioning.  The third position in the standings is the last guaranteed spot to play in the 
Champions League next year and going into the last day of the season three clubs, Arsenal, Tottenham 
and Newcastle, were still battling for the prized position.  Arsenal did end up sneaking into third place 
over Tottenham by just one point.  Although not decided until ex post, the fourth place position can also 
advance to the Champions League.  This year Chelsea won the Champions League and the fourth place 
does not qualify for the Champions League.  As for the bottom of the EPL, while Blackburn Rovers and 
Wolverhampton Wonders surely being relegated the third club to be relegated was still dependent on the 
outcome of the matches on the last day.  Depending on how things worked out Aston Villa, Bolton 
Wanderers, or Queens Park Rangers (QPR) would be relegated.  As it worked out Bolton ended up being 
relegated by one point over QPR.  This is just an example of the possible importance of the final matches 
of the season.   
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The next hypotheses deal with non-elite clubs‟ regular season performance.  
While winning is perceived to be more important to elite clubs, non-elite clubs might not 
expect to win the league and, as a result, design a club that maximizes profits through 
other means than winning as many matches as possible, this is the intuition behind H3.  
Hypothesis H3 says that neither half of the regular season impacts the non-elite club‟s 
financial performance.  Hypothesis H4 posits that non-elite clubs‟ winning percentages 
for both halves of the season have a positive effect on operating income.  Since non-elite 
clubs generally do not play internationally, the focus of their fans may be league play and 
winning as many league games as possible.  Hypothesis H4A argues that non-elite clubs‟ 
winning percentages for the second half have a larger impact on operating income than 
the first half.  During the second half, the competition to place in the top of the division to 
play internationally and not to finish in the bottom three, which results in relegation, 
becomes the focus of discussion.  As a result, fans may attend matches more regularly 
due to the perceived importance of the match.  Also, being relegated is expected to be 
financially detrimental to a club, as is discussed later.  Combining H1 and H3 yields 
hypothesis H5 which posits that the winning percentage in both halves for elite clubs is 
larger than for non-elite clubs.  Combining H2 and H4 yields H6 which posits that the 
winning percentage in both halves for non-elite clubs is larger than for elite clubs. 
With international matches, it is expected that winning should be significant for 
both types of clubs, which is posited in hypothesis H7.  International play gives clubs 
more exposure domestically as well as internationally.  This exposure can result in more 
fans, higher merchandise sales, as well as more home games, which should all generate 
higher operating income.  While the expectation is that winning at the international level 
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is significant to all clubs, is it more significant to one type of club?  Hypothesis H7A 
posits that winning is more significant to elite clubs than non-elite clubs because the elite 
clubs are more dependent on making international play to be able to pay their higher 
payroll associated with winning.
39
  The higher payrolls may leave elite clubs vulnerable 
to a cash shortfall since they have high salaries and are expected to compete in more 
international matches to recoup this expense.  On the other hand, since non-elite clubs do 
not regularly compete internationally, winning could result in international play and 
exposure where winning impacts non-elite clubs more, which is stated in hypothesis 
H7B.    
The remaining variables investigate winning and a club‟s financial performance 
through domestic cup play.  The first two hypotheses look at elite clubs and the impact 
that winning domestic games has on a club‟s financial performance: H8 posits that 
domestic cup play increases an elite club‟s operating income; advancing further in 
domestic cups provides the club with more home games as well as more exposure to 
soccer fans.  On the other hand, hypothesis H9 posits that domestic play does not impact 
an elite club‟s operating income, which would be the result if domestic cups cause 
players to tire or become injured and are unable to compete in more important matches, 
such as international play.  Hypothesis H10 (H11) is similar to H8 (H9) but focuses on 
non-elite clubs.  Hypothesis H10 (H11) follows the same justification as H8 (H9). 
In addition to the above mentioned hypotheses, the following expectations hold 
for the coefficients of the control variables.  A club that is relegated may have higher 
revenues for two reasons (β11>0).  First, a club may lower its payroll in order to generate 
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 Forrest and Simmons (2002b) find a direct relationship between team payroll and team performance. 
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higher operating income, causing the club to perform poorly and be relegated to a lower 
league.  Second, after relegation has been determined, fan attendance may actually 
increase for the remaining matches if the lower level of play the following year does not 
appeal to some fans.  As for a club that is promoted, the expectation is not as 
straightforward.  First, the operating income of a promoted club will rise as a result of 
any increase in attendance stemming from fans becoming more interested in attending 
matches when their club is winning.  However, this increase may be offset by higher 
payroll, which would reduce operating income (β10≠0).  Participating in the EPL should 
have a positive effect on operating income, since playing in the EPL generates higher 
revenue from sponsorship and media deals (β12>0).  The club‟s longest losing streak is 
expected to have a negative coefficient if losing streaks reduce revenues, as marginal fans 
become disinterested and choose not to attend the team‟s matches (β13<0).  However, it is 
also possible that when a losing streak becomes long, fans attend matches more as a 
likelihood of being relegated the following season increases (β13>0).   
B. Market Reaction to Game Outcome 
With 5,879 observations from 1998-2008, this is the largest dataset used for 
market reaction to winning and losing to date.  Similar to previous literature, betting data 
is utilized to help control for market expectations, and the day of the week to control is 
utilized to help control for day of week impacts.   
In the model for market reaction to match outcome, the dependent variable is the 
abnormal cumulative average return (ACAR) which is calculated by taking the 
cumulative average return (CAR) of the club‟s stock minus the CAR of the market.  Here 
the FTSE is used as the market index.  The CAR is calculated as follows: 
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.  (14) 
Here    is defined as the closing price before the match is played and    is defined as the 
closing price i days after the match, where i= 1, 2, or 3.  Lastly D represents all dividends 
paid out during this period.   
The empirical model that is utilized to test market reaction to a club‟s on field 
performance is: 
                                                   
                                                       
                                               
                                                       
            , (15) 
where the βs are parameters to be estimated and ε is the error term that is independently 
and identically distributed.  WIN (LOSE) is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if 
the observed club wins (losses) the match and a zero otherwise.  There is no dummy for a 
draw due to collinearity with both the WIN and the LOSE variables.  The following nine 
variables: EWIN, ELOSE, EDRAW, IWIN, ILOSE, IDRAW, EIWIN, EILOSE, and 
EIDRAW are also dummy variables. All nine variables have one of the three possible 
outcomes for a given match – win, lose or draw at the end of the variable.  These 
variables take a value of one if the observed match ended in that outcome (win, lose, or 
draw) and a zero otherwise.  If there is an “E” in front of the three possible outcomes, this 
indicates that the variable is multiplied by a dummy variable that takes a value of one if 
the club was an elite club and a zero otherwise.  If there is an “I” in front of the three 
possible outcomes, then the variable is multiplied by a dummy variable that takes a value 
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of one if the match is an international match and a zero otherwise.  As a result, “EI” 
represents elite international matches, so the variable is multiplied by both the elite and 
international dummy variables.  All matches were originally broken out to have similar 
coefficients as international matches, but the results for all these types of matches were 
not significant.  The following variables: TUESDAY, WEDNESDAY, THURSDAY, 
FRIDAY, SATURDAY, and SUNDAY all are dummy variables that take a value of one 
if the game was played on the designated day of the week and a zero otherwise.  There is 
no variable for Monday as a result of collinearity with the other six variables for the day 
of the week.  HOME is another dummy variable that takes a value of one if the observed 
club was playing at their home stadium and a zero otherwise.  GOALDIFF is the 
difference between the goals scored by the publicly-traded club and the goals scored by 
the unobserved club; the GOALDIFF will be positive when the observed club wins, 
negative when the observed club losses, and zero when the match is a draw.  
SOCCERMONTH takes a value of one if the match is played in August, a two if the 
match is played in September, and so on up until the last month of the season, which is 
May – the tenth month.  The last two variables, EXPWIN and EXPLOSE, are utilized to 
control for market expectations.  EXPWIN (EXPLOSE) is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one when the club is a heavy favorite (underdog) that loses (wins) and a zero 
otherwise.  A heavy favorite (underdog) is calculated from the betting odds where the 
club is one standard deviation above the mean for the probability of a win (loss).    
The expectations are that as long as the club‟s financial performance are affected 
by winning and losing, then the expectation is the market will react to the outcome as it 
would affect the profitability of the club.  No clear expectations are defined for the days 
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of the week, since there should not be a significant impact on the day of the week that the 
match is played.  As for HOME, the expectation is that home matches do generate higher 
revenue for clubs through ticket, concession, and retail sales.  With that said, it is unclear 
if a home match is more valuable than an away match.  GOALDIFF provides by how 
much the club won or lost by, a draw results in a GOALDIFF of zero, which can imply 
how decisive the outcome was.  GOALDIFF is expected to be positively correlated with 
the club‟s ACAR, as the more decisive the win or lose the stronger the signal.  
SOCCERMONTH could be expected to have a positive impact on market reaction if the 
matches later in the season are more important, or a negative impact if the earlier games 
are more important.  As for UNEXPLOSE and UNEXPWIN, both imply unexpected 
outcomes – which means that they both should have a significant impact on the market‟s 
reaction, indicating unexpected news to the market.  UNEXPLOSE (UNEXPWIN) 
should have a negative (positive) impact on the market, since the loss (win) was 
unexpected.   
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3.4 Results 
A. Firm‟s Financial Impact from Game Outcome 
Given that the sample is a panel, it is important to determine which estimator best 
fits the data: Pooled ordinary least squares (POLS), random effects, or fixed effects.  
Since each club likely has idiosyncratic levels of operating income, POLS does not seem 
to be suitable for the model.  The random effects model provides a better estimator for 
the following reasons.  First, not all of the EPL teams are included in the model, thus, the 
panels are unbalanced with as few as three observations to a maximum of 16 
observations.  Second, using the Hausman test to test fixed effects versus random effects 
and the Breusch-Pagan test to test the POLS model against the random effects, the 
random effects model is found to be superior.  The Hausman and the Breusch-Pagan test 
results are included in panel B in Table 15. 
Panel A in Table 15 reports the results from the random effects regression.  All of 
the control variables except for losing streak are significant and have coefficients with the 
expected signs.  EPL is significant at the 10% level and indicates that playing in the 
premier league increases operating income by more than £2.5 million per year.
40
  This is 
likely the result of increased media coverage and more lucrative sponsorship deals.  
Clubs that are relegated experience an increase in operating income of £4.85 million, 
which is significant at the 1% level.  This can be explained by one of two possibilities, 
the first being that when it appears a club will to be relegated the following year, fans 
may attend the remaining matches in greater numbers because expected competition the 
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 There was no statistically significant difference between the impact of EPL winning percentage and the 
Football League Championship winning percentage on a team’s operating income.   
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TABLE 15: Season Level Model Results 
 
Panel A reports the results from a random effects regression with adjusted operating 
income as the dependent variable and robust standard errors.  The dependent variable 
is adjusted operating income.  Panel B: The first two rows are the results of the 
Hausman test and the Breusch and Pagan test.  The next two tests are the winning 
percentages' coefficients as they are statistically different from one another.  The 
remaining tests look at the significance of non-elite clubs‟ field performances on 
adjusted operating income, which requires joint tests. 
Panel A: Model Results 
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error z 
HALF1 21.287 *** 7.384   2.88 
NEH1 -14.736 ** 7.409   -1.99 
HALF2 -4.624   8.922   -0.52 
NEH2 18.139   10.872   1.67 
IG 0.752 ** 0.310   2.43 
NEIG 0.944   0.705   1.34 
DG 0.415   0.340   1.22 
NEDG 0.086   0.398   0.22 
EPL 2.502 * 1.437   1.74 
RELEGATION 4.852 *** 1.766   2.75 
PROMOTION -4.179 ** 1.682   -2.48 
LSTREAK -0.513   0.463   -1.11 
Intercept -16.319 *** 5.163   -3.16 
Panel B: Tests for Statistical Significance 
Test Coefficient   χ2 
  
p-value 
Hausman (H0: Random Effects)     11.19   0.513 
Breusch and Pagan (H0: Pooled OLS)     15.03   0.000 
βHALF1 - βHALF2 = 0     2.99   0.084 
βHALF1 - βNEHALF1 - βHALF2 - βNEHALF2 = 0     0.78   0.378 
βIG = βIG + βNEIG     1.79   0.181 
βHALF1 = βHALF1 + βNEHALF1     3.96   0.047 
βHALF2 = βHALF2 + βNEHALF2     2.78   0.095 
βHALF1 + βNEHALF1=0 6.550       0.140 
βHALF2 + βNEHALF2 = 0 13.514 **     0.041 
βIG + βNEIG = 0 1.696 ***     0.007 
βDG + βNEDG = 0 0.502 **     0.016 
*, **, and *** indicates statistically significant from null at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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next season will be weaker.  The second argument is that the club intentionally designs a 
lower quality club having lower player salaries, a component of operating expenses, to 
generate higher operating income.  On the opposite side, being promoted the following 
year is significant at the 5% level and generates a loss of £4.18 million in operating 
income on average.  This negative relationship supports the argument that a club‟s higher 
payroll more than offsets any increase in revenue generated by dominating play in the 
current level.  Additionally, fans may decide not to attend matches at the end of the 
season and wait to attend matches the following season when the club is promoted to a 
better league with stronger competition.  This could indirectly support the UOH argument 
that fans do not want to see clubs dominate their competition.  The last control variable, 
losing streak, has a negative sign but is insignificant.  It may be that some fans want to 
see the better clubs visit before the home club gets relegated, while others, likely 
marginal fans, become disinterested after the team‟s poor performance.   
The variables of interest that are associated with a club‟s field performance and 
financial performance suggest that not all teams maximize profits in similar ways.  For 
elite teams, first half performance is statistically significant while the second half is not 
significant.   Each additional win results in an increase in operating income of £0.93 
million to £1.18 million per game, depending on how many games are played in the first 
half.  This finding goes against the hypothesis that the second half winning percentage is 
more important than the first half winning percentage, H1A.  While possibly surprising, it 
is possibly explained by fans interests shifting in the second half to international play.  In 
addition, each international game is significant at the 5% level and increases an elite 
club‟s operating income by £0.75 million, which indirectly means winning does matter in 
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international play as well, since the only way to play more international games is to 
advance further in the competition by winning the previous round.  The number of 
domestic cup games does not statistically impact operating income of elite club, which 
may result from the fact that fans are more focused on international play and possibly on 
league play.   
To examine the impact of field performance by non-elite clubs on financial 
performance requires joint significant tests, which are found in panel B in Table 15.  For 
non-elite clubs, their first half winning percentage is insignificant while their second half 
winning percentage is significant at the 5% level, resulting in each win increasing 
operating income by £0.56 million to £0.79 million depending on the number of games 
played in the second half.   This result supports the hypothesis that the second half 
winning percentage has a bigger impact on the club‟s financial performance than the first 
half, H4A.  This may be the result of fans becoming more interested in end-of-season 
games when their club may get relegated or promoted to another league.  Each 
international game played, on average, increases non-elite clubs‟ operating income by 
£1.70 million, and is significant at the 1% level.  This implies that winning international 
games impacts a club‟s financial performance, since, as mentioned above, the only way 
to play more international games is to advance further in the cup by winning.  In addition, 
non-elite clubs, on average, benefit more from playing internationally than elite clubs, 
although the difference is not statistically significant, resulting in neither H7A or H7B 
being supported.  This is likely the result of the uncommon occurrence of non-elite clubs 
participating in international play and the possible international exposure that these 
typical underdog clubs receive.  Lastly, each additional domestic cup game, on average, 
85 
 
increases operating income by £0.50 million and is significant at the 5% level.  As 
mentioned previously, domestic cup games tests a club‟s performance in the FA Cup and 
FL Cup.  As a result, non-elite clubs‟ performance in these cups does impact the club‟s 
operating income.   
While club performance on the field is a driver of the club‟s financial 
performance for all clubs, there are differences between the elite and non-elite clubs.  For 
elite clubs, performance at the beginning of the season is an important driver of operating 
income, while for non-elite clubs the second half of the season is important.  These 
findings are statistically significant and provide support of H5 for the first half and H6 in 
the second half.  One explanation is that elite fans focus on international play in the 
second half, while non-elite fans focus on not being relegated at the end of the season.  
While winning international games impacts both types of clubs‟ operating income, non-
elite clubs experience a bigger impact.  Non-elite clubs do not regularly compete in 
international play and so when they do it likely results in a bigger draw to their matches.  
In addition, such a situation might allow the non-elite club to generate relatively higher 
marketing contracts, when normalized to their typical base income in comparison to elite 
clubs, leading as a result to significantly greater impact to the non-elite clubs than a 
corresponding elite club.  The last comparison looks at the performance in the FA Cup 
and FL Cup.  Elite clubs‟ financial performance is not significantly affected by 
performance in domestic cups, which may provide support to Manchester United‟s 
controversial withdraw from the FA Cup in 1999-2000.  The same is not true for non-
elite clubs, where any additional exposure to fans is always good for these clubs.   
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To summarize the findings of this paper and the hypotheses tested, the following 
hypotheses were supported: H4A, H7, H9 and H10, while hypotheses H1A, H7A, H7B, 
H8 and H11 were all rejected.  In the case of hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H4, H5 and H6, the 
results reported in this paper only partially supported their validity.   
B. Market Reaction to Match Outcome 
After using the Hausman test and the Breusch-Pagan test, the results imply that 
the POLS model best fits the panel data examining market reaction to match outcome.  
Additionally, the White test yielded heterostedasticity and, as a result, robust standard 
errors are used in all models presented in this section.  Results gathered in this paper for 
this part of the study are as follows: The POLS output are presented in Table 16 Panel A, 
the tests for market reaction to winning and losing are presented in Panel B, testing for 
different price reactions to elite and non-elite clubs are presented in Panel C, and model 
tests are presented in Panel D.   
Looking at Panel A, there are three variables that are consistently significant: 
WIN, GOALDIFF, and SOCCERMONTH.  While WIN is significant, by itself it does 
not provide information, since it is jointly tested with other variables to test for market 
reaction to winning and losing.  GOALDIFF is positive as expected and significant in all 
models at the 10% level or higher.  It is more significant in the day preceding the match.  
The positive and significant coefficient implies that while winning and losing maybe 
significant, it is also important by how much the club wins or loses by.  A win by one 
goal is not as decisive a win as winning by three or even four goals.  This is important 
because previous literature has not controlled for goal differential.  Hence, previous 
literature have treated all wins, losses, and draws as equal, and have not controlled for the   
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TABLE 16: Market Reaction to Match Outcome 
 
Panel A presents the output of a Pooled OLS model with robust standard errors.  The 
ACAR of the club's stock is the dependent variable.  Panel B provides the coefficient 
for the two types of clubs for domestic and international matches.  Panel C provides F-
test outputs for testing if investors react differently to elite and non-elite clubs.  Panel 
D provides results of different tests. 
PANEL A: REGRESSION OUTPUT 
Variable ACAR (0,1)   ACAR (0,2)   ACAR (0,3)   
Constant -0.0009   0.0007   0.0006   
WIN 0.0052 *** 0.0101 *** 0.0126 *** 
LOSE -0.0022   -0.0038 * -0.0047 * 
EWIN 0.0005   -0.0013   -0.0037   
ELOSE 0.0013   0.0054   0.0041   
EDRAW 0.0025   0.0029   0.0010   
IWIN 0.0024   0.0061   0.0008   
ILOSE -0.0020   0.0091   0.0115   
IDRAW 0.0008   0.0045   -0.0042   
EIWIN -0.0049   -0.0084   -0.0047   
EILOSE -0.0051   -0.0239 ** -0.0238   
EIDRAW -0.0050   -0.0114   -0.0055   
TUESDAY 0.0021   0.0003   0.0004   
WEDNESDAY 0.0016   0.0036   0.0053   
THURSDAY 0.0037   0.0007   0.0025   
FRIDAY -0.0073   -0.0118 * -0.0120   
SATURDAY 0.0007   -0.0006   -0.0012   
SUNDAY 0.0012   -0.0014   -0.0011   
HOME -0.0012   -0.0014   -0.0004   
GOALDIFF 0.0014 ** 0.0010   0.0011   
SOCCERMONTH -0.0004 ** -0.0007 *** -0.0007 ** 
UNEXPLOSE -0.0031   -0.0055   -0.0120 *** 
UNEXPWIN 0.0053   0.0021   0.0017   
PANEL B: TEST MARKET REACTION 
Non-Elite Win 0.0043 * 0.0108 *** 0.0123 *** 
Non-Elite Lose -0.0031   -0.0031   -0.0040   
Non-Elite Draw -0.0009   0.0007   0.0006   
Elite Win 0.0048 * 0.0096 *** 0.0095 ** 
Elite Lose -0.0018   0.0023   0.0001   
Elite Draw 0.0016   0.0036   0.0016   
Non-Elite International Win 0.0067   0.0170   0.0141   
Non-Elite International Lose -0.0051   0.0060   0.0075   
Non-Elite International Draw -0.0002   0.0052   -0.0036   
Elite International Win 0.0023   0.0073   0.0057   
Elite International Lose -0.0090 ** -0.0125 ** -0.0121   
Elite International Draw -0.0026   -0.0033   -0.0081   
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TABLE 16 (Continued) 
PANEL C: ELITE VERSUS NON-ELITE 
Elite Win=Non-Elite Win 0.07   0.28   1.50   
Elite Lose=None-Elite Lose 0.54   3.98 ** 1.53   
Elite Draw=Non-Elite Draw 1.74   1.36   0.12   
Elite Int. Win=Non-Elite Int. Win 0.41   0.67   0.47   
Elite Int. Lose=Non-Elite Int. Lose 0.24   3.12 * 1.70   
Elite Int. Draw=Non-Elite Int. Draw 0.15   0.43   0.16   
PANEL D: MODEL TESTS 
Hausman 5.11   13.07   19.97   
Breusch and Pagan 0.00   0.00   0.00   
White 180.53 *** 177.97 *** 220.58 *** 
*, **, and *** indicates statistically significant from null at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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magnitude of the outcome, i.e. the importance of the signal.  As for SOCCERMONTH, 
the coefficient is negative and significant for all models at the 10% level or higher.  The 
surprising result here is the coefficient is negative, which implies there is smaller positive 
reaction to winning and a stronger negative reaction to losing later in the season.  This 
may be the result of losing in later months being interpreted as a stronger signal of 
possible relegation.  Additionally, it may also imply that investors react more to the 
earlier matches since they are a measure of the club‟s performance throughout the 
remainder of the season than matches played later in the season, which are played when 
knowledge of the club‟s performance is more clear.  The day of week control variables 
are all statistically insignificant at the 10% level in all models except for FRIDAY, which 
is negative and significant at the 10% level for the two day ACAR.  UNEXPLOSE and 
UNEXPWIN are important control variables which represent when a club is upset or 
upsets another club.  UNEXPLOSE is only statistically significant when looking at the 
three day ACAR, however, in all cases the coefficient is negative – as expected.  
UNEXPWIN, while positive in all models is statistically insignificant in all models.   
Looking at Panel B of Table 16 provides the results of market reaction to match 
outcomes.  The interesting finding is wins have a statistically significant impact on both 
elite and non-elite clubs‟ stock price while losses and draws have no statistically 
significant impact on stock prices.  These results contradict other findings that both 
winning and losing have an impact on stock performance (Renneboog and Vanbrabant 
(2000)), in addition to finding that losing has a negative impact on stock price and 
winning has no impact on stock price (Brown and Hartzell, (2001) and Bernile and 
Lyandres (2011)).  While losing is related to potential relegation, winning is associated 
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with promotion to higher leagues and international play.  In addition, while the previous 
section found that non-elite and elite clubs‟ financial performance are affected differently 
by winning and losing, the market reaction to winning and losing for elite and non-elite 
clubs are not statistically different, except for two-day ACAR for losses and international 
losses.  Panel C provides F-tests to test if investors react differently to elite and non-elite 
club performance.  This finding seems to imply that investors, for the most part, react to 
match outcome the same – regardless of club type.  Lastly, international losses for elite 
clubs are the only international matches that result in a statistically significant outcome.  
The elite international loss yields negative ACAR for the one-day and two-day time 
horizon, but not the three-day.  While international wins and draws are not significant, 
Edmans et al. (2007) provide the explanation that, in international play, a loss usually 
results in elimination and a win only signals possible advancement.  This argument 
implies that losing may be a stronger signal than losing and explains why only losing 
yields statistically significant ACAR.  It is possible that a non-elite clubs‟ performance in 
international play does not yield a reaction because these clubs are not expected to play 
internationally and have already exceeded expectations.   
For robustness, the model is run without Arsenal and Manchester City, since their 
stocks are traded on the PLUS Market Group, a London-based security exchange 
formerly known as OFEX, which is a less liquid market than the exchanges where other 
clubs‟ stocks are traded.  These results are presented in Table 17 and are nearly identical 
to the previous results.  The three major differences are now as follows: The GOALDIFF 
is positive and statistically significant across all models, elite international losses are  
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TABLE 17: Robustness Market Reaction to Match Outcome 
 
Panel A presents the output of a Pooled OLS model with robust standard errors.  The 
ACAR of the club's stock is the dependent variable.  Panel B provides the coefficient 
for the two types of clubs for domestic and international matches.  Panel C provides 
F-test outputs for testing if investors react differently to elite and non-elite clubs.  
Panel D provides results of different tests. 
PANEL A: REGRESSION OUTPUT 
Variable ACAR (0,1)   ACAR (0,2)   ACAR (0,3)   
Constant -0.0011   0.0008   -0.0017   
WIN 0.0050 ** 0.0100 *** 0.0129 *** 
LOSE -0.0022   -0.0032   -0.0037   
EWIN 0.0020   -0.0003   -0.0022   
ELOSE 0.0010   0.0042   0.0024   
EDRAW 0.0025   0.0021   0.0006   
IWIN 0.0002   0.0030   -0.0033   
ILOSE -0.0037   0.0062   0.0078   
IDRAW -0.0014   0.0017   -0.0079   
EIWIN -0.0045   -0.0079   -0.0070   
EILOSE -0.0063   -0.0255 ** -0.0242   
EIDRAW -0.0069   -0.0131   -0.0069   
TUESDAY 0.0030   0.0008   0.0033   
WEDNESDAY 0.0019   0.0031   0.0069   
THURSDAY 0.0066   0.0034   0.0083   
FRIDAY -0.0060   -0.0143 * -0.0125   
SATURDAY 0.0016   -0.0007   0.0004   
SUNDAY 0.0019   -0.0021   -0.0006   
HOME -0.0018 * -0.0018   -0.0006   
GOALDIFF 0.0018 *** 0.0015 ** 0.0015 * 
SOCCERMONTH -0.0004 ** -0.0006 ** -0.0006 * 
UNEXPLOSE -0.0030   -0.0052   -0.0128 ** 
UNEXPWIN 0.0051   0.0022   0.0019   
PANEL B: TEST MARKET REACTION 
Non-Elite Win 0.0039   0.0108 *** 0.0112 *** 
Non-Elite Lose -0.0033   -0.0024   -0.0054   
Non-Elite Draw -0.0011   0.0008   -0.0017   
Elite Win 0.0058 * 0.0105 ** 0.0090 * 
Elite Lose -0.0023   0.0018   -0.0030   
Elite Draw 0.0014   0.0029   -0.0011   
Non-Elite International Win 0.0040   0.0138   0.0079   
Non-Elite International Lose -0.0071   0.0038   0.0024   
Non-Elite International Draw -0.0025   0.0025   -0.0096   
Elite International Win 0.0015   0.0056   -0.0013   
Elite International Lose -0.0123 ** -0.0175 ** -0.0193 * 
Elite International Draw -0.0070   -0.0085   -0.0158 ** 
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  TABLE 17 (Continued) 
PANEL C: ELITE VERSUS NON-ELITE 
Elite Win=Non-Elite Win 0.70   0.01   0.36   
Elite Lose=None-Elite Lose 0.30   2.01   0.44   
Elite Draw=Non-Elite Draw 1.33   0.61   0.04   
Elite Int. Win=Non-Elite Int. Win 0.13   0.48   0.55   
Elite Int. Lose=Non-Elite Int. Lose 0.38   3.41 * 1.70   
Elite Int. Draw=Non-Elite Int. Draw 0.38   0.65   0.25   
PANEL D: MODEL TESTS 
White 173.79 ** 178.72 *** 234.76 *** 
*, **, and *** indicates statistically significant from null at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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 negative and statistically significant across all models, and the elite international draws 
are statistically negative for the three-day ACAR.    
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3.5 Conclusion 
The analysis provided herein shows that over the period from 1993-2008, game 
performance did impact the operating income of publicly-traded clubs.  Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that this conclusion is not as straightforward as expected.  Previous 
studies of stock market reactions to wins and losses have had mixed results.  Yet, the 
previous literature did not separate clubs into elite and non-elite clubs.  From the results 
generated in this work, it would appear that the two types of clubs are impacted by 
winning in different ways.  It seems that elite teams benefit more from winning than 
lower tier clubs, since elite clubs experience a larger financial impact from league 
performance and tend to play internationally more regularly.  While financials seem to be 
affected differently by the type of club, the market reaction to winning and losing does 
not seem to be influenced by the type of club.  This is likely the result of investors being 
unaware of the difference between the strategies of these types of clubs.   
The findings in this paper also are significantly different that other papers that 
have looked at market reaction to the on-field performance.  Here it is found that winning 
in non-international play has a positive and statistically significant impact on stock price, 
while draws and losses have no statistically significant impact on stock price.  This 
contradicts the two previous findings that losses and draws have a statistically negative 
impact on stock price, while wins have no statistical impact or the finding that all 
outcomes have a statistical impact.  Although, when looking at international play, 
international losses for elite clubs do generate statistically negative reactions and, in some 
cases, so do international draws – which is consistent with Edmans et al. (2007). 
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While, in the United States, no sports team is currently publicly-traded
41
, it is, 
nevertheless, likely the case that sports teams in the United States can also be broken into 
two types of teams as well, especially since leagues in the United States do not use 
promotion or relegation.  When not facing promotion or relegation, teams may be able to 
reduce their payroll with little or no consequences.  The findings in this paper suggest an 
explanation to the Pittsburgh Pirates financial success while not performing successfully 
on the field.  If the Pirates are a lower tier MLB team, their financial success may not be 
influenced by on-field success compared to elite teams.   
This paper fills a gap in the literature focusing on soccer clubs‟ field 
performances and its impact on the club‟s financial performance.  Additionally, this paper 
shows that not all clubs are the same:  Elite clubs are designed for winning; non-elite 
clubs are designed to simply compete.  Nevertheless, when non-elite clubs play at the 
highest level, they benefit more than elite clubs. 
The findings in this paper show that sports clubs are not the same: When looking 
at a club‟s stock reaction to match outcomes, all clubs should not be treated equally.  
With that said, a club‟s ability to win a match influences its financial performance in a 
positive relationship, indicating that a win can be interpreted as a signal of positive firm 
performance and a loss is a signal of bad firm performance.  With these interpretations, 
the opportunity to use publicly-traded sports clubs‟ data to test financial implications 
should become more commonplace.
42
  While the sports industry is a great empirical 
                                                          
41
 Note that some clubs are subsidiaries of publicly-traded corporations, but there are no independently 
traded clubs with their own stock.  The Green Bay Packers are a publicly owned non-profit organization 
whose shareholders do not receive dividends and shares cannot be resold, except back to the team for a 
fraction of the original price (Kuriloff, 2010).   
42
 Sports betting markets have been used extensively to test market rationality, efficient markets, and to 
find anomalies.  Sauer (1998) provides a general overview on the betting market. Some key papers 
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laboratory for studies in economics and finance, it is important to realize not all clubs are 
identical.   
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
looking at rationality and efficiency in the betting market include:  Figlewski (1979), Gandar et al. (1988), 
Woodland and Woodland (1994), and Gray and Gray (1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: A RE-EXAMINATION OF ASYMMETRIC REACTION TO GOOD  
AND BAD NEWS: A TEST FROM MATCH OUTCOME 
Market reaction to firm announcements has been a main area of financial 
research.  This research focuses directly on the issue of market efficiency and how 
quickly information is reflected in stock prices.  Evidence of stock drifts, caused by the 
slow incorporation of information into stock prices, contradicts the argument that 
financial markets are efficient.  It has been shown that many types of announcements, 
from the release of macroeconomic indicators to firm specific news, are quickly and 
efficiently reflected in a firm‟s stock price.   
The focus of this paper is on how stock prices react to good and bad news.  This 
work builds off of Chan (2003), who finds that bad news correlates with negative drifts 
that last longer than the drift for good news.  He interprets the longer drift for bad news 
as the market taking longer to fully react to the bad news.   
In this paper the outcome of matches between publicly-traded English soccer 
clubs are used as a measure of good news, for the winner, and bad news, for the loser.  
Effectively, this study examines the stock price reactions to a win and a loss to determine 
whether the reaction to good and bad news is symmetric.  Using the outcome of a 
sporting event is not new to the financial literature.  Specifically, Palomino et al. (2009) 
looks at 16 UK soccer clubs over three seasons and finds that the stock market reacts 
faster to wins than losses.  These results are consistent with Chan‟s (2003) findings, 
indicating that the market reacts faster to good news than bad news.  However, Palomino 
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et al. randomly dropped one of the clubs from their analysis when the match was played 
between two publicly-traded clubs.  While they do not clearly explain why they dropped 
a club, it maybe because they assumed the reaction to a win and a loss would be 
symmetric.  The major difference between Palomino et al. (2009) and this paper is that in 
the latter only matches between publicly-traded clubs are used and the impact of news on 
the stock prices of both clubs is tested.   
A unique feature of using the release of sports scores as a source of information, 
is that they are readily reported, significantly reducing the issue of media bias.  One 
major bias found, in general, with media information, is that negative news tends to 
generate higher media coverage.  Specifically in economic news, this phenomenon has 
been documented by Harrington (1989) and Gaa (2008).  Harrington (1989) finds that 
bad economic news gets greater media coverage than good economic news, except in 
election years.  Gaa (2008) finds evidence of asymmetric reporting in earnings 
information, noting that more negative earnings information is likely to result in media 
coverage.    
Using the features of match outcome between publicly-traded English soccer 
clubs offers a unique financial framework that allows for an ideal natural simultaneous 
test of market reaction to good and bad news: The test focuses on how the market 
responds to a single event that will impact two stocks simultaneously but in potentially 
different ways.  By looking at the reaction of both stock prices to the outcome of the 
same match, it is possible to directly examine if there exists an asymmetric reaction to 
good and bad news.  Due to the regular and rapid postings of match results in 
newspapers, TV reports, and many (reputable) sports-related internet websites, the 
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specific match outcomes are rapidly disseminated to all shareholders simultaneously.  
This rapid and simultaneous dissemination of the same information, considered good 
news by some shareholders and bad news by others, eliminates the existence of investors 
who might be privy to information before it becomes public knowledge.  An additional 
feature of sports scores is the clarity of information.  A win is a win, and a loss is a loss.  
There is no grey area for information interpretation.  As a result, any differential response 
between good news and bad news can be better assessed.   
An important component of information is the validity and importance of the 
information.  This directly relates to the discussion of does winning really matter to a 
soccer club‟s financial performance.  In the literature, there is the debate as to whether 
sports clubs are profit-maximizers or win-maximers.  Since all sports clubs are firms, 
financial theory would say they must maximize shareholders‟ value.  Berkowitz (2011) 
finds that the field performance of English soccer clubs affects the club‟s financial 
performance, which implies that relevant news regarding the club‟s future financial 
performance is released in the matches‟ outcomes.  This information should result in 
changes in the club‟s stock price and implies that sports clubs maybe both profit-
maximers as well as win-maximizers, since winning has a positive impact on financial 
performance. 
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows:  Section 4.1 discusses the previous 
literature.  Section 4.2 describes the data.  Section 4.3 formulates the methodology used 
to test the hypotheses.  Section 4.4 provides a discussion of the results, and Section 4.6 
provides further analysis of the signals of winning and losing.  Lastly, Section 4.7 offers 
concluding remarks.    
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4.1 Literature Review 
This paper extends the literature in two different areas.  The first is the relation of 
stock prices to media coverage.  The second area is the examination of sports club‟s field 
performance and its impact on the club‟s stock price.  While the first area of literature is 
extensive, only a brief general overview of the literature focusing on stock reaction to 
firm specific news is presented.   
A. Market Reaction to Good and Bad News 
Pritamani and Singal (2001) discuss three important characteristics of information 
signals.  The first characteristic is magnitude, a measure of the signal‟s importance.  
Blume et al. (1994) suggest that price change is a good proxy for a signal‟s magnitude.   
The second characteristic is precision, a measure of the signal‟s quality or 
validity; in the previous literature trading volume has been used as a proxy to measure 
precision.  A potential problem with this is that there are two contradicting arguments to 
measuring precision using this proxy.  A more precise signal could lead to a high volume, 
if it provides investors with more confidence in their valuation of a stock which would 
result in them taking larger positions.  On the other hand, a precise signal could lead to a 
low volume, if it contributes to a convergence in expectations across investors, as they 
are more likely to have similar beliefs with a more precise signal.  Vega (2006) finds that 
the more information investors have about the value of an asset, the more they trade on 
this information, supporting the argument that higher volume is correlated with precise 
signals.   
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The last characteristic is dissemination, or the percentage of traders who receive 
the signal.  “For signals of the same precision, the greater the level of dissemination, the 
smaller will be the volume because with greater dissemination there will be a smaller 
divergence of opinion” (Pritamani and Singal, 2001).  One concern with dissemination is 
the leaking of information to investors before public announcements, which is one 
possible reason why reactions are sometimes found prior to a signal.  This latter 
complexity, however, concerning the early release of information does not exist in the 
case of sporting events, since the matches are highly publicized events and the results are 
displayed in real time to all interested parties.   
Pritamani and Singal (2001) define an event as a large abnormal daily stock 
returns.  They find that positive (negative) events accompanied by a public 
announcement are followed by a statistically significant positive (negative) abnormal 
return, which is not the case for events not accompanied by a public announcement.  
Their evidence is moderately consistent with both strategic trading under information 
asymmetry and the investor sentiment hypothesis.  Antweiler and Frank (2006) examine 
the impact of news on daily returns of stock prices.  Their results indicate that, in 
American stock markets, it is common place for a prompt reaction to be followed by a 
gradual reversal, the result of overreaction.  Such a reversal is found to occur more 
frequently during periods of expansion.   
Chan (2003) examines monthly stock returns focusing on stock performance 
when there is public headline news and when there is no news reported about the firm.  
Chan (2003) finds that bad news results in negative drifts that last longer than the positive 
drifts for good news, noting that the under reaction is mostly confined to small stocks.  
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From this Chan concludes that the longer drifts for bad news are the result of the market 
taking longer to react to the bad news.  This result is confirmed in Hong et al. (2000), 
Depken (2001), Vega (2006), Schmitz (2007), and Palomino et al. (2009).  In confirming 
Chan‟s results, Depken (2001), Vega (2006), and Schmitz (2007) provide some 
additional insight into market reaction to news. 
Depken (2001) shows the variance of mature firms‟ reactions is symmetric for 
good and bad news while the variance of younger firms‟ reactions is asymmetric.  
Depken shows this by utilizing the GARCH model, but only uses ten randomly selected 
split stocks.   
In the case of Vega (2006), the additional and more interesting finding is that 
“public announcements that generate under reaction are associated with the arrival rate of 
noise traders, while public information that make markets more efficient are associated 
with the arrival rate of informed traders.”   
Finally, in the case of Schmitz (2007), the following additional findings should be 
noted: a) an overreaction to good news the day following the release is reversed in the 
following trading days, and b) that short-term post-earning announcement drifts (PEAD) 
are stronger for bad news.  Schmitz, similar to Chan, finds his results are stronger for 
small firms.  Additionally, Schmitz finds that trading volume is abnormally high for both 
good and bad news several days after the event, indicating that investors trade more 
frequently after an event occurs.  Furthermore, Schmitz looks at different types of 
investing behavior of investors and observes that individual investors react slower to new 
information than the average investor.   
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There is a growing amount of literature showing that bias in media coverage 
brings into question whether news is credible regardless of whether it is considered good 
or bad news.  Shiller (2000) argues that the media hyped Internet stocks during the period 
of the Internet bubble and that hype was a major factor contributing to the Internet 
bubble.  Evidence presented by Bhattacharya et al. (2009) supports Shiller‟s argument 
that the media hyped Internet stocks during the Internet bubble. However, they show that 
the media hype can only explain about 2.9% of the rise of Internet stock prices.  There 
are additional biases in the media that confirm Shiller‟s argument that the media 
influences which events get more attention.
43
   
While there is an overwhelming amount of literature that shows that drifts exist 
after news coverage or firm announcements, there are only several well-developed papers 
that provide a theoretical model to explain the existence of these drifts.  Daniel et al. 
(1998) develop a model in which stock prices overreact to private-information signals 
and underreact to public signals.  Their theory is based on overconfidence and changes in 
confidence arising from biased self-attribution.  Lastly, they argue that overconfidence 
can decrease volatility around public news events.  Similar to Daniel et al. (1998), 
Barberis et al. (1998) build a model involving investor sentiment to explain the under- 
and overreaction to new information.  Their parsimonious model results in investors 
underreacting to earning announcements and similar events, which provides information 
that is of low strength but high in significant statistical weight.  Additionally, they assume 
                                                          
43
 A common bias that is documented is the media tends to focus on negative news (See Harrington 
(1989), Soroka (2006), and Gaa (2008)).  Soroka (2006) provides a general overview of the literature on 
asymmetric responses to information from multiple disciplines. 
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consistent patterns of good or bad news represent information that is high in strength but 
low in weight, which results in overreaction. 
While Barberis et al. (1998) and Daniel et al. (1998) use representative agent 
models, Hong and Stein (1999) develop a model explaining under- and overreaction to 
information using two groups of bounded rational traders, each of which is able to 
process only a subset of the available public information.  Their model is able to provide 
explanations to under- and overreaction.  When news watchers are the only active group, 
prices adjust slowly to new information resulting in underreaction.  However, when a 
second group of traders tries to exploit this underreaction with a simple arbitrage strategy, 
the result is overreaction created by excessive momentum in prices.  Hong and Stein‟s 
(1999) model has three testable implications: (1) Both short-run continuation and long-
run reversal should be more pronounced in those (small, low-analyst-coverage) stocks 
where information diffuses more slowly; (2) there may be more long-run overreaction to 
information, which is initially private, than to public news announcements; and (3) there 
should be a relationship between momentum traders‟ horizons and the pattern of return 
autocorrelations.  Hong et al. (2000) find evidence consistent with the gradual-
information-flow model in Hong and Stein (1999), but admit their findings could be the 
result of short-sale constraints impeding the adjustment of price to negative information.   
Frazzini (2006) uses the disposition effect, introduced into the finance literature 
by Shefrin and Statman (1985), to explain the underreaction to news.  The disposition 
effect is the tendency that investors sell winners and hold losers.  Frazzini (2006) uses a 
dataset of mutual funds holdings to test his hypothesis that bad (good) news moves 
slowly across stocks trading at large capital losses (gains), leading to a negative (positive) 
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price drift.  He confirms his hypothesis that the disposition effect explains underreaction 
to news.   
B. Literature on Sports Clubs‟ Stock Performance 
Brown and Hartzell (2001) is the seminal paper that looks at the impact of a 
sports club‟s game outcome, winning or losing, on its stock price.  In their work they 
look at the stock price of the National Basketball Association‟s Boston Celtics reaction to 
the club‟s performance over a 12-year period.  They find that wins and losses in 
postseason play impacted stock price and volume, however, during the regular season 
only losses had a significant effect on stock price. 
In Europe, there have been many publicly-traded professional soccer clubs.  As a 
result, there have been multiple papers that have followed the Brown and Hartzell (2001) 
path to examine the impact of performance on publicly-traded soccer clubs.  Renneboog 
and Vanbrabant (2000) find that winning generates positive abnormal returns, while 
draws and losses generate negative abnormal returns.  The authors observe that publicly-
traded soccer clubs tend to underperform the market and argue many investors are just 
fans that get utility from being part owners of a soccer club. Zuber et al. (2005) also note 
that these investors are not typical investors – referring to them as “investor-fans,” who 
receive utility of holding a share of their favorite soccer club.  Benkraiem et al. (2002) are 
the first to consider the location of the game, home or away, and find home losses have a 
greater negative impact on the club‟s stock than away losses.  However, they find no 
significant reaction to a win.  They utilize data for only the 2006-07 season for 18 
publicly-traded European soccer clubs.  Stadtmann‟s (2006) findings, using data from the 
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German soccer club Borussia Dortmund, are also consistent with Renneboog and 
Vanbrabant (2000). 
Polomino et al. (2009) further extends  the literature on winning and losing by 
looking at the speed of the reactions and find that the market reacts faster to winning 
(good news) than to losing (bad news).  Their work is consistent with the literature 
related to market reaction to firm news.   
A unique application of the use of sports clubs‟ performances has been to 
examine investor sentiment.  Edmans et al. (2007) used national soccer clubs‟ 
performances as a proxy for investor sentiment and found an asymmetric reaction to 
losses, which resulted in a strong negative stock market reaction, while wins caused no 
significant stock market reaction.
44
  They conclude that stock prices are affected by the 
investor‟s mood.
45
  Kaplanski and Levy (2010) derive a strategy to exploit this 
phenomenon by utilizing the U.S. market, since one-third of all U.S. market transactions 
involve non-U.S. investors.   
Bernile and Lyandres (2011) also use a novel proxy from sports to examine 
investors‟ expectations.  Utilizing a sample of 20 publicly-traded European soccer clubs 
and contracts traded on betting exchanges as a proxy of investors‟ expectations, they find 
that investors‟ sentiment partially explains the systemic bias in the investors‟ ex ante 
expectations.  This bias results in disappointment ex post, resulting in the negative 
abnormal returns ex post for losing teams.  
                                                          
44
 Edmans et al. (2007) also looks at international play in cricket, rugby, ice hockey, and basketball with 
similar findings, except for ice hockey. 
45
 It should be noted that Boyle and Walter (2003) found no relationship between the New Zealand stock 
market’s return and the performance of New Zealand national rugby team.  Ashton et al. (2003) found  
that the English stock market did well (poorly), in the broadest of terms, when England’s national soccer 
club won (lost).   
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4.2 Data 
This paper uses English soccer matches‟ outcomes to test whether the market‟s 
reaction to good news and bad news is asymmetric.  From 1992-2008 there were a total 
of 17 English soccer clubs whose stocks were traded on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE), the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) or the PLUS Market Group (PZ).
46
  
Although some data exists for some clubs that were publicly-traded before 1992,
47
 the 
data set primarily only goes back to 1992 because the English Football League 
restructured the various leagues for the start of the 1992-1993 season.
48
  The sample 
period ends with the 2007-2008 season, with only six clubs still publicly traded, and three 
of these clubs going private within the year.  The initial sample is comprised of 1,327 
matches.  Matches where the two clubs‟ stocks were not traded on similar days around 
the match are discarded, leaving 1,267 matches.
49
  Additionally, there are 316 matches 
that ended in a draw, since a draw does not result in a clear signal of good news or bad 
news, they are removed.  This leaves 951 matches to be used in the empirical analysis.   
The time and date of each match was observed from statto.com and confirmed by 
BetExplorer and ESPN.  Since the time of the match, be it early in the season or late in 
the season, will likely impact the findings, the variable MONTH is created that takes a 
value of one if the match is played in August (first month of the season), two if match is 
                                                          
46
 The PZ is a London-based security exchange formerly known as OFEX, which is a less liquid market of 
the three exchanges.  The AIM is a part of the LSE, but is designed for small and growing companies, 
which results in the AIM having less restrictive listing requirements than LSE. 
47
 The first publicly-traded English soccer club was Tottenham Hotspur in 1983. 
48
 The Football League was restructured to allow the English Premier League (EPL) to compete more 
competitively with the other elite clubs across Europe.  As a result of the restructuring the EPL was free to 
negotiate its own broadcast and sponsorship agreements.   
49
 This is primarily the result of the PZ not always operating on same days as the other markets, primarily 
the result of holidays. 
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played in September (second month of the season), and so on up until ten, which 
represents a match played in May, the last month of the season.   
Each type of match is recorded as well; there are five different types of matches.  
The first two types are regular season games with the first being between two EPL clubs, 
and the other is between two clubs in the Football League Championship, formally 
Division One, (D1).  The third type of match is a playoff game, hereafter referred to as 
PLAYOFF.  Only D1 has playoff games, which are used to select the third club to be 
promoted to the EPL for the following season from the clubs that finished between third 
and sixth in the standings.  The fourth type of game is a tournament game, hereafter 
referred to as FAL, which is played in one of the two national tournaments, League Cup 
(FL Cup) and Football Association Cup (FA Cup).  The FL Cup and the FA Cup are 
knockout tournaments played in England between EPL teams and non-EPL English 
teams.  The FA Cup in recent years has experienced a rapid increase in participating 
teams, with 731 clubs competing in the 2007-2008 FA Cup, while the FL Cup 
consistently has only the top 92 English clubs.  The last type of game is the Community 
Shield (SHIELD) which is played annually between the champion of the EPL and the FA 
Cup winner and has no bearing on a club‟s standings.  The club‟s rank in their division is 
observed after each game, as well as the number of goals scored by each club.  A ranking 
of one means the club is in first place, i.e. a lower ranked club has earned more points 
through the season and is arguable a better club. 
Betting odds from BetExplorer are collected for each match to control for 
expectations.   Betting odds are only reported in 703 of the 951 matches in the sample.  
Until the start of the 1998-1999 season, no betting data was available on regular season 
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games, and not until October 2004 is betting data available for all remaining types of 
games; although all SHIELD and PLAYOFF games in the dataset are before October 
2004.  The betting odds are transformed into the subjective probabilities using the 
identical approach as Sauer (2005), but adjusting the approach to include draws.   
Summary statistics on the matches are provided in Table 18.  While not going into 
great detail on the summary statistics, the results of the one-day returns from the entire 
dataset are discussed. It should be noted that similar analysis can be done on each 
subcategory.  Looking at HOME, since this variable is a dummy variable, the mean of 
.603 indicates 60.3% of the matches, or 405 matches, in the dataset were won by the 
home club, indicating the remaining 39.7% of the matches, or 267 matches, where won 
by the away club.  Similar analysis can be done to examine the percentage and number of 
matches within the dataset that fall into each game type (EPL, D1, and FAL), having an 
elite club as the winner (WELITE), and have an elite club as a loser (LELITE).  Looking 
at the rank of the winning and losing clubs, on average, the winner‟s rank is lower than 
the loser‟s rank, which is not surprising especially when one examines the probability of 
outcomes from the betting odds.  The betting odds imply the winning club was expected 
to win, as calculated from the subjective probability.  Potentially the most interesting 
observation from Table 18 comes from the examination of daily returns in both panels 
where one can see that the average return tends to be non-negative.  This is interesting in 
that previous papers in the literature tend to find the asymmetric reaction reduces, or is 
removed, several days after the event.  
Daily closing stock prices are collected for all clubs for the entire period the club 
is traded from Bloomberg.  Additionally, dividends, splits, issuance, or reverse-splits  
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information is also collected.  This data is used to calculate the club‟s stock reaction to 
each game outcome.   
Lastly, it is important to note that all but two soccer clubs (Arsenal and 
Manchester United) are small stocks with market capitalizations below £400 million.  
Arsenal is slightly above the upper echelon of small cap stocks with a market cap as high 
as £724.8 million, this is only due to each share is in excess of one million British 
pounds; Arsenal only has about 600 shares outstanding.  As a result, it is possible to make 
the case that Arsenal is also a small cap firm, with so few shares outstanding.  
Manchester United is likely the only club in this dataset to exceed the classification of a 
small cap firm with a market that peaked at £1,071.5 million.  Since previous works have 
noted that the asymmetric market reaction to news is most common in small stocks, this 
dataset consists of firms that are likely to have an asymmetric reaction.   
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4.3 Methodology 
This paper looks at average returns (AR) as well as average cumulative returns 
(ACR).  The return on the stock over horizon T, where T is as short as one day or as long 
as five days, is: 
     
             
    
,  (16) 
where Pi,T is the closing price of stock i on day T, and Di,t is the dividend paid on stock i 
over the time period.  To examine if the market reaction to winning and losing is 
symmetric, the return of the losing club is subtracted from the return on the winning club, 
DIFFRETURN.   
To examine if the market reaction is symmetric a two-staged model is used.  The 
first stage will control for club effects with the model taking the following form: 
                                  , (17) 
where WINNER is a vector of dummy variables that take the value of one if the 
designated club wins the match and a zero otherwise, LOSER is a vector of dummy 
variables that take the value of one if the designated club loses the match and a zero 
otherwise, and ε is a zero mean random error term. 
The second stage will use the fitted returns from the first stage for each match and 
control for match characteristics.  As a result, not only can the market reaction to winning 
and losing be observed, but which characteristics of the match result in stronger 
asymmetric reaction can also be examined.  The second stage model takes the following 
form: 
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 ,   (18) 
where            is the fitted difference return from the first stage.  HOME is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the winning club is also the home club and 
a zero otherwise.  GOALDIFF is the goals scored by the winning club minus the goals 
scored by the losing club.  MONTH is the month of the season.  WELITE (LELITE) 
represents if the winning (losing) club is an elite club and a zero otherwise.  WRANK 
(LRANK) is the ranking of the winning (losing) club in their league as a result of the 
outcome of the match.  WPROB is the probability of the winning club winning the match 
from the betting odds. DPROB is the probability of the match ending in a draw from the 
betting odds.  Investor sentiment was proxied by using betting data to interpret 
expectations of outcome, which Baker and Wrugler (2006) show have implications on 
small stocks, which most soccer club stocks are classified as.  The remaining variables 
(D1 and FAL) are dummy variables that take a value of one if the match is of that type 
and a zero otherwise.  Note that EPL matches do not have a dummy, since they are used 
as the base matches.   
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4.4 Results 
Discussed in this section are the results from the model using the entire dataset, 
the following section will offer robustness checks.  Since the first stage of the model is 
just a model to control for club characteristics, all 951 matches still in the dataset are used 
where stock price data is reported in Bloomberg for both clubs.  For the second stage, 
only 703 matches with betting data are utilized, since in the second stage betting odds are 
used as control variables to estimate investor‟s expectations of the match outcome. 
Table 19 provides the output from the second stage and tests for the cumulative 
return (CR) to good news and bad news, winning and losing.  When looking at the tests 
for symmetric reaction, Table 19 Panels B through D, the results indicate the market has 
no asymmetric reaction to winning and losing, the proxies for good and bad news.  The 
market reaction is not significantly different from zero, which implies the market does 
not react faster to winning, for any of the types of matches or combinations of types of 
clubs.  This evidence goes against Polomino et al. (2009) findings that the market reacts 
faster to the win.  The advantage to our dataset is it looks at the market reaction to 
winning and losing simultaneously compared to Polomino et al. (2009), who look at the 
cumulative reaction of games over a season.  As a result, it is likely that the simultaneous 
comparison is a better measure of market reaction to winning and losing.  It is worth 
noting while the different types of clubs do not influence the results in panels B, C, and 
D, the coefficients in the model are of significance.  When an elite club wins, the market 
reaction to the combined news is more positive after the first day, but by the combined 
cumulative reaction after the fifth day, the reaction is significantly negative.  This is the   
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only case where one sees any evidence of overreaction.  As for when elite clubs lose, the 
reaction is negative and significant at the 1% throughout the five-day period.  This 
indicates the market seems to react stronger to the news that the elite club lost, likely the 
result of news against market expectations. 
There is minimal variation in market reaction between EPL, FA Cup, and FL Cup 
matches resulting in the coefficient for FAL being insignificant.  However, this is not the 
case for D1 matches, where the coefficient is significant and negative, which implies that 
the market reaction for the winner and the loser, combined, is more negative than for EPL 
matches, but when combined with the constant, it does not result in a reaction that is 
significantly different from zero.  So while D1 matches seem to show a stronger 
asymmetric reaction with stronger reaction to losing, it is still not significant.   
Looking at Panel A provides match characteristics that impact the asymmetric 
reaction.  Many of the control variables seem to provide little explanatory power.  While 
the WRANK is not significant in the model, the LRANK is significant and negative for 
all the cumulative returns.  This implies the lower the quality of the losing club, the 
stronger the asymmetric reaction there is – which follows the argument that losing for 
lower ranked clubs may be more costly because they are closer to being relegated at the 
end of the season.  Potentially the most surprising results are that the coefficients for 
WPROB and DPROB, which controls for market expectations, are insignificant.  Only in 
the one-day return is DPROB significant at the 10% level, which indicates while the 
outcome may have been expected by some, it was not the entire market‟s expectation that 
this was the outcome.  As a whole, it seems market expectations provide little explanation 
to the variation in the market reaction to winning and losing.  
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While there is no evidence in the cumulative return for a preference toward an 
asymmetric reaction of winning over losing, there seems to be some weak evidence of 
this occurring in the daily returns.  The results from the daily returns can be seen in Table 
20.  Here, in both D1 and tournament matches, there is an asymmetric reaction in the 
third-day return.  This is found in the D1 match and tournament matches between non-
elite clubs, as well as in tournament matches where an elite club defeats a non-elite club.  
While these results are significant at the 10% and 5% levels, they do not clearly support 
the asymmetric reaction argument.  It is possible this positive reaction is a delayed 
reaction to winning or a possible adjustment to overreaction to the losing club.  Both of 
these explanations do not have implications supporting the markets asymmetric reaction 
to good and bad news.  Additionally, for many types of matches, it is seen that there is a 
significant and negative reaction in the fifth-day returns.  This reaction is found in six of 
the nine different matches.  The most likely explanation for these daily returns may be 
that there is an overreaction to both good news and bad news.  The market adjusts for the 
overreaction to losing on the third day, and adjusts to the overreaction to the win on the 
fifth day.  The examination of reactions to winning and losing individually is found in the 
next section.   
One of the most interesting findings in Table 20 is when examining the dummy 
variables WELITE and LELITE, the variables seem to switch signs over the time 
horizon.  For WELITE the coefficient is positive and significant for the day-one and day-
three daily returns.  However, it actually flips and becomes negative and significant for 
the day-four and day-five daily returns. The coefficient for LELITE is negative for day-
one, three, and five daily returns, but it is positive for the day-two daily return.  It seems  
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that for elite clubs, winning results in a stronger reaction with an overreaction to winning 
that results in adjustments on the fourth and fifth day following the game.  It is also 
possible that the negative reaction in the fifth-day‟s return is evidence of the lag in the 
market reaction to losing, and, therefore, supports the asymmetric reaction to good and 
bad news found in the literature.   
When examining the control variables in the daily returns there are only minor 
changes.  For example, HOME is now significant and positive for the daily returns on 
day two.  Similarly, WPROB is now significant and positive at the 1% level for the daily 
return on day two.  This seems to imply that there may be an underreaction on the first 
day following a match when a club is expected to win.  LRANK in the CR was negative 
and significant for all CR.  While in the daily returns, it is still negative and significant 
but for only the day-one and day-two returns.  
While Polomino et al. (2009) find an asymmetric reaction to winning and losing, 
there is little evidence of this occurring in the findings presented here.  The following 
section provides additional tests to confirm the findings above.    
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4.5 Robustness Check 
In order to verify the findings presented in the previous section, a few robustness 
checks are performed.  The first is to remove matches with clubs that are traded on the 
PZ, Arsenal and Manchester City, because this market tends to be less liquid than the 
LSE or AIM, which may be skewing the data.  The second test is concerned with using 
only matches where all data is available, specifically examining only matches where 
neither club plays another game for at least five days.  Lastly, the author looks at the 
market reaction of winning and losing separately to see if there is a clear discrepancy in 
the reaction to winning and losing individually. 
A. Removal of PZ Clubs 
As a result of removing the matches with clubs whose stocks are publicly-traded 
on the PZ, the results still remain similar with a few differences.  Table 21 displays the 
CR and Table 22 displays the daily returns.  Now controlling for month is negative and 
significant at the 10% level over the two-day and three-day CR, indicating the combined 
reaction is more negative in later months.  This may be the result that losing results in 
worse news than winning results in good news, while this is possible, it would be hard to 
explain.  Another change is that while LRANK is still negative, it is only significant in 
the two-day, four-day, and five-day CR.  As for the reaction to each type of match and 
type of club, there is only one case where the reaction is significantly different from zero 
and that is the two-day CR for D1 matches.  While D1 matches yield a negative and 
significant CR at the 10% level, it seems to be the result of the coefficient for D1 which 
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is highly significant and negative, perhaps indicating losing in D1 is worse news than 
winning in D1.  This outcome is likely the result for all clubs that are relegated to D1, 
since they are trying to get back into the EPL, which becomes more difficult after each 
D1 loss.   
Similar to the CR, the daily return models have similar results when the PZ clubs 
were included.  The most striking changes are the R
2
 increases for all models, as well as, 
the day-five daily returns are only negative for two of the nine types of matches.  This 
indicates that the possible overreaction to winning or evidence of asymmetric reaction to 
winning and losing seems to be reduced, and may have been the result of the more 
illiquid securities impacting the results.   
Overall the market reaction to winning and losing is still symmetric, and the 
previous evidence of the market reacting faster to winning than losing has disappeared.     
B. Matches Without Another Match for Five Days 
The CR and daily returns from the model using only data where another match is 
not played for at least six days after the match examined are in Table 23 and Table 24.  
Removing matches where a club played shortly after their last match, confirms that the 
next match does not have any impact on the returns for the matches observed.  While the 
next match should not impact the results, since the match outcome is unobserved, this test 
just verifies this argument.  As a whole, it is not surprising that the results are similar, 
since the data is similar.    
While the constant is still not significant, it has become positive for all CR.  This 
was not the case in the original dataset, where the CR was negative for the first two  
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days.  As for the control variables in the model, their results are nearly identical in 
significance and size as the output from using all matches.   
Examining panels B through D, there is only one case where the CR is 
significantly different from zero, and that is found in the day-one returns for tournament 
matches – where an elite club defeated a non-elite club.  Here the joint returns are 
statistically positive at the 10% level, indicating evidence of a potentially quicker or 
larger reaction to winning.  While this is evidence of asymmetric reaction to good and 
bad news, it is important to note that the two types of clubs may have different impacts in 
the signal of winning and losing a tournament match, resulting in asymmetric signals, 
which would explain this result.   
As for the daily reactions, there are more changes in the control variables than in 
the CR, resulting in the significances of some variables to change slightly.  More 
importantly, the significant and positive daily return found on the third day after many 
matches is no longer significant, and the second-day returns are negative and significant 
for two of the nine types of matches.  While this may be the adjustment of overreaction to 
the win, it could be evidence in the delay in the reaction to the loss.  This will be 
discussed more when examining the returns of winning and losing separately.   
It is interesting to note that looking at the proxy for investor sentiment, probability 
of the winning club winning; it has become significant for the first two days‟ daily 
returns.  While it is negative for day one, it becomes positive and highly significant for 
day two.  This seems to imply that when the outcome is expected the combined return 
seems to react to the loss more on the first day and is then followed by a stronger reaction 
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to the win, which may imply the market reacts faster to the negative news, which is 
opposite to the findings of Chan (2003).   
These results seem to be predominantly consistent with the previous results and 
show only weak evidence of asymmetric market reaction to good and bad news.   
C. Winner and Loser 
In previous tests, the returns of the winning and losing club have been combined 
to see if the market reaction to winning and losing is symmetric.  In this section, the 
reaction to winning and losing will be separated to see how the market reacts to each 
component separately.   
Table 25 and Table 26 report the CR and the daily returns for winners.  When 
looking at the control variables for the CR, there is little consistency over time on 
significance.  With that said, there are some clear consistencies that can be made.  First, 
winning at home does result in a higher CR for the winner.  Second, the market seems to 
have more positive reactions that are stronger when a non-elite club is not competing in 
the match.  This is observed from the negative market reaction to the winner or loser 
being an elite club.  Also, the reaction to winning D1 matches compared to EPL matches 
is smaller over the two-day horizon after the match, but it then reverses and results in a 
larger reaction to winning D1 matches than EPL matches.  This significantly larger 
reaction to D1 over the longer horizon is the result of winning in D1 generates higher 
future revenues for the club than winning EPL matches.  Clubs that win in D1 get 
promoted to the EPL – resulting in a large increase in revenues.  Last, looking at the two 
control variables from the betting market to control for market expectations of the match, 
imply that winning when the club is not expected to win, or is a more competitive   
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match, results in a stronger reaction to the win.  This can be seen by the negative 
coefficient for the probability of the club winning and the positive coefficient for the 
probability of the clubs drawing.  The probability of the outcome being a draw can be the 
strongest measure of the uncertainty of the match, since close matches are the most likely 
to result in a draw.  The control variables impact on the daily returns is relatively similar 
to their impact on the CR, except for HOME which has no significance when looking at 
the daily returns.   
While many of the control variables are significant, the CRs are not significantly 
different from zero except for D1 matches looking at the four-day CR which is only 
significantly different from zero at the 10% level.  When looking at the daily returns for 
all matches, there is a positive and highly significant reaction to winning on the third day 
of trading for all matches.  This seems to imply there is a lag in the market to winning.  
While this lag does occur, there is no reversal.  Overall, it seems the market does not have 
a strong reaction to winning.   
Table 27 and Table 28 report the output of the CR and the daily returns of losing.  
For losing it seems the lower the clubs ranking in the standings, the stronger the reaction.  
This is likely the result of the club being relegated the next year.  Similarly, the market 
reacts more negatively to a D1 loss than an EPL loss which implies losing in the EPL is 
not as bad a signal as losing in D1. – likely because an EPL club is already in the EPL, 
while a club in the D1 is trying to get back up to the EPL, which is less likely with every 
loss.  Additionally, it is possible relegation from D1 or D2 is worse than being relegated 
from the EPL to D1, which is the result of continuously losing.   
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The market reaction is faster to losing than to winning.  This can be seen by a 
negative market reaction to losing the next trading day, which is significant at the 1% 
level.  For winning, the positive market reaction occurs on the third day.  However, the 
market underreacts to losing, since there is still a negative market reaction on the second-
day return for about half the matches.  This lag in the reaction is consistent with previous 
literature looking at market reaction to negative news. Since there is no significant 
overreaction to losing the CRs are negative and significant for the entire five-day period 
for almost all matches.  While these results are similar to previous findings they 
contradict the literature on good news and bad news.  As a result, a further examination 
of winning and losing is necessary.  Is it possible that the signal of winning is not equal to 
the signal of losing?  Section 4.6 takes a closer look at whether these signals are of equal 
strength.    
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4.6 Winning and Losing Signal 
In order to examine if winning and losing have the same signal, a total of 5,700 
match outcomes are examined from 1992-2008.  For each club, their matches are broken 
up by season, with the outcome of the match being one of three options, win, lose or 
draw.  As a result, there are three dummy variables that are created that take a value of 
one if the match results in that outcome for the club.  Additionally, there are six dummy 
lags as well: win, lose and draw for the previous match and for the match before the 
previous match, two matches ago.  Two separate models are created with only the 
dependent variable being either a win or a loss in terms of the current game.  The 
independent variables are concerned only with the outcome for the previous two 
matches.
50
   
                                                  (19) 
A random effects model is utilized with for clustering by club to see if losing or winning 
a game has any explanatory power on future performance.  The results are reported in 
Table 29.  Panel A provides the output with the dummy for losing as the dependent 
variable.  Here neither dummy for winning is significant, but both dummies for losing are 
significant.  This implies while winning the previous matches has no bearing on whether 
the club will win the next match, losing the previous matches increases the chance of a 
club losing the next match.  Examining the results from Panel B, where winning is the 
dependent variable, there is no effect of winning the previous matches, while losing the 
match two matches before is significant and negative, implying losing may reduce the 
                                                          
50
 The dummy for a draw is not included due to collinearity with win and lose dummies.   
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chances of winning future matches.  As a result, from both models, it seems that losing is 
a stronger signal than winning. Since the market reacts faster to good news, this finding 
explains why the asymmetric reaction to good and bad news is not observed in the results 
presented above. 
 
  
TABLE 29: Explanatory Power of Winning and Losing 
 
Below is the output from random effects model seeing if past performance of the last 
two games has explanatory power on the outcome of the next game.  Clustering is 
used to control for clubs.  Panel A provides for losing while Panel B provides results 
for winning. 
PANEL A: LOSING 
    Coefficient   Z   p-value 
LAGWIN   0.0147   0.85   0.395 
LAGLOSE   0.0364 ** 2.49   0.013 
LAG2WIN   -0.0033   -0.29   0.771 
LAG2LOSE   0.0267 * 1.66   0.096 
CONSTANT   0.2915 *** 15.43   0.000 
PANEL B: WINNING 
    Coefficient   Z   p-value 
LAGWIN   0.0101   0.62   0.538 
LAGLOSE   -0.0128   -0.73   0.465 
LAG2WIN   0.0057   0.35   0.729 
LAG2LOSE   -0.0342 * -1.96   0.051 
CONSTANT   0.4372 *** 25.59   0.000 
*, **, and *** indicates statistically significant from null at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
This paper uses a unique dataset of market reaction to matches between two 
British football clubs to test the reaction to good and bad news simultaneously.  While 
other papers have found market reaction to be quicker to good news, the signal of good 
news in some cases can be arbitrary.  In this paper, two clear simultaneous signals are 
provided, one good the other bad, from the one event, a football match.  Using this 
situation it is actually observed that the market reacts faster to the bad news, losing.  
Upon further analysis, it is determined that the faster market reaction to bad news is 
actually a result of losing being a stronger signal than winning.   
The fact that the signals of losing and winning are not of equal strength helps 
explain the results reported in this paper relative to the earlier findings of Brown and 
Hartzell (2001), Edmans et al. (2007), Benkraiem et al. (2009), and Bernile and Lyndres 
(2011) who all find a strong reaction to losing, but not to winning.  Until now these finds 
were not able to be explained. 
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